



POLITICAL RESEARCH: ORGANIZATION AND DESIGN

PROD TRANSLATIONS

PLEASE SUBSCRIBE

IN THE NEWS

Is There No European Opinion?	Gérard Herberichs	3
Reflections on the Nature of Economic Power	Jean Lhomme	10
The Law of Outer Space	A. Galina	19
The Italian Socialist Party and Political Participation	Alessandro Pizzorno	25
Annotated BIBLIOGRAPHY on Policy Research and Political Behavior		32
EDITORIAL: No Prescription Without Diagnosis		36

IN THE NEWS. Of general interest: The *Council for Financial Aid to Education* estimates annual cost of higher education may reach \$9 billion by '69-'70. Nearly \$2 billion must be private gifts and grants, incl. \$500 million from business, \$390 million from foundations. * * * Value of college endowments estimated at \$5.6 billion last year, 55% of which was held by 17 institutions. * * * NY State Education Dept. finds base expenses per student in private NY institutions between \$1.2M and \$2.8M, with rises between 8% and 51% over '53-'54 ranges; public institution expenses rose 5%. * * * In '58 Protestant churches received \$2.35 billion from members, over \$60 per member; one-fifth was for home & foreign missions & overseas relief. * * * Since '50, in West Germany, corporate giving has quintupled; up to 10% of taxable corporate and individual income may be deducted for philanthropy. * * * The journal *Confluence* is no more, having turned materials & subscriptions over to *Daedalus*, whose purpose is "to create a channel of communication at the highest level among leaders of all fields of intellectual endeavor."

FOUNDATIONS: Ford F. announced creation of *Committee on the University & World Affairs* to study participation of U. S. universities in international education, research & technical assistance. Grants include \$150M (1st installment on \$900M) for the *Penna.-N.J.-Del. Metropolitan Project*, involving research & development re govt. organization, recreation, many other topics, in 11 counties in the 3 States; \$325M to *Inst. of International Education* for third year of American-Polish scholar exchange. * * * Ford also budgeted \$466M to its Overseas Development program for services of expert consultants. * * * Ford gave \$225M & Rockefeller Brothers Fund \$53M to *Inst. of Public Administration* to expand its program of metropolitan & urban research. * * * Carnegie gave \$190M to SSRC to support program to advance research on Latin America, also \$66.5M to Lawrence Col. for program of Asian studies, \$47M to U. of Cal. for a history of the Muslim world. * * * Kellogg F. gave \$347M to *Amer. Assoc. of School Administrators* to improve quality of school leaders & administrators. * * * Fund for the Advancement of Education granted \$800M to Wayne State U. College of Education to experiment with revised program for professional teacher education. * * * Rockefeller F., United Hospital Fund, & New York F. each gave \$40M to finance studies by Columbia's School of Public Health & Administrative Medicine *NYC Commission on Health Services*.

continued on p. 18

PROD is an informal, independent Journal. It circulates information and ideas about researches that might advance man's knowledge of public policy and political behavior. PROD seeks to

Criticize policy research.

Put new theories before the field.

Ease communications among scholars.

Make political theory more operational.

Improve social research design and organization.

Promote consensus on the subjects and priorities of study.

Accommodate the tools of other disciplines to the science of policy.

Translate and circulate the best of political science and policy research from overseas.

EDITORIAL AND PUBLICATION OFFICES: PROD, Post Office Box 294, Princeton, New Jersey. Managing Editor: Alfred de Grazia. Assistant to the Editor: Ted R. Gurr. Business Manager: Jean Arrott. Promotion: Eileen Lanfeld.

PROD is published ten times a year (September through June) by the Institute of Political Science of Princeton, New Jersey, 306 Nassau Street, Princeton, New Jersey. Every second issue consists of articles translated from languages other than English. All rights to contents of PROD are reserved to PROD's authors and/or PROD. For permission to use any of PROD's contents, apply to specific authors or to PROD.

SUBSCRIPTIONS: Individual: \$4.00 a year. Institutional: \$5.50 a year. Commercial: \$13.00 a year. Address: Post Office Box 294, Princeton, New Jersey.

Please Renew Subscriptions Promptly.

7-8-60
Postage

Is There No European Opinion?

The public's lack of information and dearth of opinion on political and economic matters, well known to pollsters in the United States, are also common in Europe. Nearly fifty polls and surveys conducted in various European countries between 1948 and 1958 are summarized, most of them dealing with supra-national bodies such as the Council of Europe and the European Common Market. The principle of European unification had strong public support, but there was wide-spread public ignorance of specific institutions, as well as ignorance of internal politics; on the average, 40% to 50% of those polled would express no opinion on the desirability of a given supra-national institution.

This article originally appeared in *INTERNATIONALE SPECTATOR*, a bilingual review published in The Netherlands, XIII (July 8, 1959), pp. 353-68, under the title, "L'Europe sans opinion?" It was translated by Jacques Laberrère.

On the 5th of May, 1958, the Council of Europe commemorated its tenth anniversary. It took this occasion to look back on its first decade of work and to draw up a provisional balance sheet. Some cordial speeches were made, rightly congratulating the Council on its activities during the period.

But the most important contribution to the anniversary mood was made by the Council itself, in the form of a chapter from the annual report delivered by the Secretary-General, entitled "Public Opinion in Europe."¹ One of the essential duties of the Council has been to develop public opinion favorable to European union. Is it only coincidence that for the first time in ten years a special chapter of the annual report is assigned to so important a topic? However that may be, we must express our satisfaction with the honesty the Council displayed in tackling this subject, for there is some discrepancy between the figures and the optimistic mood of the anniversary.

The following question was posed by the first paragraphs of the report: was not the goal of the 1948 The Hague Council — *i.e.*, to create an opinion adequately prepared for the construction of a European democracy — "ambitious," in the face of "previously known facts concerning public opinion?" Mr. Lodovico

Benvenuti, Secretary-General of the Council, expressed his opinion much more frankly in his report to the Consultative Assembly.² "I must tell you, Mr. President," he said, "that while studying this problem with my associates from the Information Department I became familiar with certain polls of public opinion that did not comfort me at all, but that, on the contrary, urged me to an examination of our work in influencing European opinion." The Secretary-General added that he did not want to take up in his report all the figures resulting from those polls, "not wanting to give an overly pessimistic appearance to this chapter, and more especially because I am still very skeptical of the methods used for these polls, and, consequently, of the real value of the results. Nevertheless, these results do deserve to be pondered, whatever one thinks of their accuracy."³

We wish to emphasize again that the following figures must be judged with great caution. There is a flagrant lack of consistency in the polls we quote. As far as we know, at no time was a single poll using the same questions given simultaneously in the 15 countries of the Council of Europe. Thus the data we have on European public opinion are dissimilar and incomplete.

With this reservation, we will at-

¹*La coopération européenne en 1958, 1ère partie.* Chapter 7, pp. 101-12.

²Eighth meeting of the eleventh session, April 24th, 1959.

³*Compte rendu officiel*, 3-11.

tempt to summarize some of these results. The substance of the statistical materials quoted may be found either in the Council report itself or in the Secretary-General's address printed in the official transcriptions of the afternoon meeting of April 24, 1958. Our account deals first with the *degree of information*, i.e., the level of public awareness, of European affairs. Then we will consider more closely the *opinion* itself, i.e., the public valuation of European affairs.

THE DEGREE OF INFORMATION

Generally, we may say that the polls made on this subject indicate a large degree of ignorance.

Council of Europe

A poll by INSOC made in Belgium in 1950 suggested that 14% of the Belgian public had a "good" knowledge of "what the Council of Europe was about," whereas 25% knew it "well enough," 36% "vaguely," and 25% "not at all."⁴ In West Germany, in September, 1955, 52% of the public had "already heard of" the Council of Europe, whereas 48% had not.⁵

European Community for Coal and Steel (CECA)

In June, 1950, 77% of West Germans polled had "heard of" the Schuman pool and 23% had not.⁶ In September, 1952, in a poll in France, 28% of the people consulted had not "heard of" the Schuman pool, 72% had "heard of it" but only 65% knew what industries were affected by the plan and only 53% knew that Germany was a member of the pool.⁷

In March, 1953, a poll was taken in West Germany asking what had become of the Schuman pool. Twenty-two per cent of those polled were currently informed, 4% were partially informed,

⁴INSOC, 1955, no. 6, p. 111.

⁵Jahrbuch der öffentlichen Meinung 1947-1955. Institut für Demoskopie, Allensbach a. Bodensee, p. 340.

⁶Ibid., p. 343.

⁷Sondages, 1958, nos. 1-2, pp. 167-68.

⁸Jahrbuch 1947-1955, p. 344.

⁹Ibid., p. 345.

¹⁰Sondages, op. cit., p. 168.

and 74% did not know at all.⁸ During the same poll the question, "What is the CECA?" (*die Montan-Union*) was asked again. Twenty-eight per cent of the West German public were familiar with it, 12% were slightly familiar and 60% were not at all familiar with it.⁹

From a poll made in France in 1954, it appeared that only 20% of the French knew the supra-national character of the CECA.¹⁰

In February, 1956, 47% of the West Germans had heard of the *Montan-Union*, 38% of the *Europäische Gemeinschaft für Kohle und Stahl*, 29% had heard of the High Authority in Luxembourg and 17% had heard of the Schuman pool.¹¹ European Defense Community (CED)

On the basis of a pool in France in September, 1952, 80% of the French had "heard of" the CED.¹² In England, 1954, in response to the question, "Have you heard of the CED?" 32% of those polled answered affirmatively.

In 1955 the INSOC institute polled the Belgian public, asking, "Do you know the principal features of the European Defense Community project?" Twenty-two per cent answered "with accuracy," 51% "vaguely" and 27% "not at all."¹³

Euratom

In May, 1957, 53% of the French public asserted that they had "heard of" the Euratom project, whereas 47% had not. However, among the 53% only 35% knew that France was a member of the plan.¹⁴ In February, 1956, 75% of the West Germans had neither read nor heard the word "Euratom."¹⁵

Common Market

It is interesting to note that in the previously mentioned poll of May, 1957, the French public was asked whether it had "heard of" the Common Market

¹¹Jahrbuch der öffentlichen Meinung 1957, p. 345.

¹²Sondages, op. cit., p. 133.

¹³INSOC, op. cit., p. 112.

¹⁴Sondages, op. cit., p. 170.

¹⁵Jahrbuch, 1957, p. 363.

project. Sixty-four per cent said yes, 36% said no; only 49% knew that France had a share in the project.¹⁶

SOME COMPARISONS

The large degree of ignorance indicated by these figures is notable. One would not be far from the truth to see in them proof of a general public disinterest in European affairs. But it must be added that the interest of this same public in political questions in general, and in topics of international politics in particular, does not seem any keener. The general public tends to be interested only by the most substantial, the most immediate events. Where spectacular events were concerned, such as the disastrous flood in Holland in the winter of 1953, or the Sputnik launching in the autumn of 1957, or Malenkov's fall in February of 1955, almost everyone knew about it, respectively 99%, 96% and 87%, according to various polls.¹⁷ But where purely political matters are involved public interest is much less, since these matters do not seem to touch directly on the existence or the living standard of the individual and require a certain intellectual effort and considerable knowledge to be understood.

In general, one may say that the topics of internal politics interest the public much more than do international affairs. This is corroborated by all the polls made on this matter, in Western Europe or in the United States.¹⁸ Thus, before wondering at the lack of interest and at the ignorance of the people toward European affairs, it is interesting to consider certain other data.

Information on National Politics

In May of each year from 1951 to 1955, the West German public was asked whether it knew what the *Bundesrat* was. In each of these five polls, only a

portion between 8% and 11% of those polled was able to give a correct answer. Between 56% and 64% had no idea of the nature of the *Bundesrat* and between 28% and 34% had inaccurate conceptions of it.¹⁹

In May, 1955, only 50% of the West German public had followed the debates in the *Bundestag* on the status of the Saar Basin.²⁰

Information on International Matters Essential to Their Own Country

In November, 1954, 63% of the French public claimed to have "heard of" the nine-member conference that had just taken place in London. But only 36% had any idea of the results of that conference.²¹

In January, 1955, only 54% of the West German public knew that the French National Assembly had ratified the treaties of Paris.²²

During September, 1955, 35% of the West German public claimed to have followed "carefully and regularly" the Adenauer negotiations in Moscow; 52% followed them incompletely and 13% not at all.²³

In December, 1955, 63% of the French public had "heard of" the referendum of the Saar Basin but only 49% knew that the European status had been refused.²⁴

General Information on International Politics

In 1948, 17% of the Belgian public claimed to have read "regularly" in newspapers about events in Palestine, 31% "sometimes," 25% "rarely" and 27% "never."²⁵

In November, 1954, 70% of the French public did not know about the latest Soviet proposals on disarmament.²⁶

In June, 1955, only 34% of the French public knew of the conclusion of the Austrian treaty by the Four Powers.²⁷

¹⁶Sondages, *op. cit.*, p. 171.

¹⁷Cf. respectively *Jahrbuch 1947-1955*, p. 347; *Sondages, op. cit.*, p. 121; *Jahrbuch 1947-1955*, p. 335.

¹⁸Cf. *Sondages, op. cit.*, pp. 11-12, 39.

¹⁹*Jahrbuch 1947-1955*, p. 278.

²⁰*Ibid.*, p. 326.

²¹*Sondages, op. cit.*, p. 141.

²²*Jahrbuch 1947-1955*, p. 365.

²³*Ibid.*, p. 336.

²⁴*Sondages, op. cit.*, p. 41.

²⁵*INSOC.*, *op. cit.*, p. 110.

²⁶*Sondages, op. cit.*, p. 116.

²⁷*Ibid.*, p. 41.

During the same month, 57% of the French public was aware of the preparation of the big four conference in Geneva, but only 42% were able to cite the participating countries.²⁸

In November, 1955, 56% of the West German public claimed to know what NATO was, while 44% had no idea. Of the 56%, only 19% were able to state accurately the goal of NATO, while 21% had a dim notion of it.²⁹ In the same poll it was indicated that 12% of the West German public had an exact idea of the difference between NATO and the UN, and another 18% had a vague notion of the difference.³⁰

These figures regarding public interest in and awareness of public affairs suggest that one need not wonder about the small degree of interest and knowledge concerning *European* affairs. The comparison does not seem unfavorable to Europe but, on the contrary, relatively favorable. It is particularly remarkable because most European institutions seem for various reasons to be condemned *a priori* to remain unknown to the general public. One of these reasons is the lack of any direct effects of the resolutions made by these institutions; another is that the multiplicity of the European institutions cause the public to confuse one with another. A third reason, no doubt, is the frequently technical character of the work of these institutions; it is difficult, even impossible, to understand their operations without some specialized knowledge.

PUBLIC VALUATION

Let us examine public opinion on European affairs more closely. It is obviously necessary to make a distinction between the amount of information possessed by people who have been polled, and their valuation or appraisal of a particular subject. The fact that an individual has little information or not much interest concerning the proceed-

ings of a certain European assembly must not be considered a mark of hostility. It is perfectly conceivable that such a person is an enthusiastic "European." On the other hand, there must be a good number of opponents to the idea of unified Europe who are informed to the last degree.

Valuations of the Unification Principle

A large majority of the public seems to adhere to the principle of European unification. For example, one could mention the results of the "trial" referendums made in Holland in 1952: there was participation by 75% of the electoral body in Delft, and by 88% in Bolsward. Ninety-three per cent of those voting in Delft and 97% in Bolsward voted for a unified Europe.³¹ Similar referendums organized in 1950 at Castrop-Rauxel and at Breisach in West Germany, and in 1953 at Roulers and Verviers in Belgium, gave percentages of the same high order.³²

In regularly conducted polls in France between 1947 and 1957, a constant majority of about 60% favored the principle of European unification. About 10% of the French public opposed the principle, and 30% reserved their opinion. For ten successive years these proportions remained nearly constant, with only minor fluctuations.³³ It is no less remarkable that similar polls carried out in West Germany in September, 1955, and December, 1956, gave analogous results. To the question, "If there were a referendum, would you vote for or against the United States of Europe?" respectively 68% and 75% of those polled answered "For," 7% and 5% "Against," while 25% and 20% were undecided.³⁴ The European idea apparently has a great prestige among the public. At any rate, the figures decide against those who claim that the European idea is dead; in the countries that have examined, the public seems ready to vote for a unified Europe.³⁵

²⁸*Ibid.*, p. 41.

²⁹*Jahrbuch 1957*, p. 339.

³⁰*Ibid.*, p. 341.

³¹*De Europese Beweging: ontstaan, doel en werkwijze*, p. 42.

³²*Ibid.*

³³*Sondages, op. cit.*, pp. 29-35.

³⁴*Jahrbuch 1957*, p. 342.

³⁵*Sondages, op. cit.*, p. 161.

Valuations of Actual Applications

Whereas the majority of the public responds favorably to questions of the type, "Are you for or against Europe?" many shades of opinion appear when the question is stated more precisely.

The Political Standpoint: A poll conducted in France in September, 1952, indicated that 59% of the public were ready to accept the establishment of a "general government" for Western Europe that would decide "everything concerning Western Europe as a whole," but would leave each participating country "the right to settle matters concerning itself alone." Eighteen per cent were against the creation of such a government and 23% reserved their opinion. But in the same poll, when the interviewers pointed out that such a government could occasionally be induced to make some decisions opposed to the interests of France, the number of pros dropped from 59% to 26%, the number of cons increased from 18% to 23% and the number of undecided jumped from 23% to 51%.³⁶

In May, 1957, a ratio of 55% of the French public favored the creation of "a union of Western Europe." But when they were asked whether they would agree to "a political federation . . . in which the power of decision would belong to a general government and not to the governments of the participating countries," only 35% agreed.³⁷

We previously mentioned that during September, 1955, 68% of the West German public was ready to vote for the creation of a United States of Europe. But when those polled were asked if they were ready to accept the decisions of a European parliament as compulsory, only 25% answered affirmatively.³⁸

The Economic Standpoint: It is on the economic level—in the broad sense—that the idea of European unification has become most concrete. From a poll made in France in May, 1956, about

60% of the supporters of the European union thought that it was better to stress economic questions.³⁹ There are many data on public appraisal of the new economic institutions.

(1) *European Community for Steel and Coal (CECA).* A poll made in France in July, 1954, gave the following results: 22% of those polled were "in favor of the CECA," 20% were "somewhat in favor of the CECA," 6% were "somewhat against the CECA" and 8% were "definitely opposed to the CECA"; 44% reserved their opinion.⁴⁰

In April, 1956, in a poll in West Germany, the following question was asked: "Did West Germany make a mistake by joining the CECA?" This question was put only to those who were familiar with the goals and activities of the CECA, i.e., 26% of those polled; of this 26%, 38% answered, "It was not a mistake." 19% answered, "It was a mistake." and 43% were undecided or without opinion.⁴¹

In comparing these two polls, we note that in both countries a proportion of about 40% favored the CECA, whereas those opposed were 14% and 19%, respectively. The proportion of persons who were undecided or had no opinions was practically the same in both countries, respectively 43% and 44%.

(2) *The Common Market.* A poll conducted in France in May, 1957, gave these results: 35% of those polled approved completely, 25% approved to some extent, 7% disapproved to some extent, 4% disapproved completely and 29% reserved their opinion.⁴² During the same poll the French public was also asked whether it thought that the Common Market would increase the French standard of living rather than decrease it. Thirty-three per cent were expecting an increase in the standard of living, 13% a decrease, 9% expected "no effect" and 45% reserved their opinion.⁴³

³⁶*Ibid.*, p. 163.

³⁷*Ibid.*, p. 164.

³⁸*Jahrbuch 1957*, p. 344.

³⁹*Sondages, op. cit.*, p. 166.

⁴⁰*Ibid.*, p. 169.

⁴¹*Jahrbuch 1957*, p. 349.

⁴²*Sondages, op. cit.*, p. 171.

⁴³*Ibid.*, p. 172.

TABLE I: Opinions On The Effects Of The Common Market

COUNTRY	USEFUL PER CENT	PREJUDICIAL PER CENT	INEFFECTIVE PER CENT	NO OPINION PER CENT	TOTAL PER CENT
BELGIUM	52	4	1	43	100
ITALY	43	7	4	46	100
GERMANY	41	12	5	42	100
THE NETHERLANDS	38	18	7	37	100
FRANCE	34	15	4	47	100
AUSTRIA	49	9	10	32	100
DENMARK	45	3	4	48	100
NORWAY	40	9	4	47	100
GREAT BRITAIN	39	15	2	44	100
SWEDEN	33	13	5	49	100
	414/1000	105/1000	46/1000	435/1000	1000

On November 2, 1957, the *New York Herald Tribune* published the results of a poll in which the people of ten countries were asked, "Do you think that the Common Market is useful or prejudicial to your country?" The results are given in Table I.

(3) *Euratom*. A poll made in France in May, 1957, gave these results: 31% of those polled approved of Euratom, 29% disapproved, and 40% reserved their opinion.⁴⁴

The following conclusions are suggested.

(1) The number of those completely opposed to the principle of European unification seems to be extremely small; it varies from about 10% in France to 5% or 7% in West Germany.

(2) The number of those completely opposed to the concrete application of European unification is somewhat higher, especially when political matters are involved or it is thought that "national sovereignty" is at stake. However, in neither case is the number of opponents greater than 23% of the public.

As for economic matters, the number of opponents is still smaller; in general, the proportions are between 10% and 20%. The public conviction that these institutions will increase the standard of living is doubtlessly the explanation.

(3) When one shifts from the abstract principle of European unification

to its realization, it is not the proportion of opponents that increases but rather the proportion of those who are undecided and without opinion. This is a phenomenon of prime importance: almost always, faced with actual political or economic realization, virtually half the public is undecided or without opinion. There are two factors involved. One is self-interest, which will become increasingly apparent. The other is ignorance: the issues are technical and complex, and lacking information, the public finds it very difficult to make appraisals.

(4) As for the *New York Herald Tribune* poll, it is remarkable that among the 105 per thousand opponents to the Common Market in all ten countries, 56 per thousand were from the five member nations of the Common Market included in the poll, and only 49 per thousand were from the five non-member countries. The highest number of opponents was found in a member nation, The Netherlands.

RELATIONS BETWEEN THE LEVEL OF INFORMATION AND ATTITUDES

Perhaps the superficial character of public information on European affairs is frightening. A careful study is necessary to determine the cause of this situation. Is the public uninformed on European affairs because it is not interested by these increasingly technical

⁴⁴*Ibid.*, p. 170.

TABLE II: Opinions On Euratom

	INFORMED INDIVIDUALS	MISINFORMED INDIVIDUALS	TOTALS
APPROVE	21%	10%	31%
DISAPPROVE	8%	21%	29%
RESERVE THEIR OPINION	6%	34%	40%
	35%	65%	100%

problems? Or is the public inadequately informed because of insufficient press and information services? These are questions of prime importance.⁴⁵

It is not the very limited public awareness that is most striking, however. The most characteristic phenomenon is the very large proportion—from 40% to 50%—of the European public that is without opinion or undecided. When the public is asked to give its opinion on a specific question, those expressing no preference tend to equal in number all those who have either a positive or a negative opinion.

In September, 1952, a poll made in France indicated a certain relationship between information and public valuation. The results were as follows:⁴⁶

72%	knew of the Schuman pool
28%	did not know of the Schuman pool.
<hr/>	
46%	favored French participation
12%	opposed French participation
14%	reserved their opinion
28%	were not interrogated, not knowing of the pool
100%	

After a concise explanation of the pool:

60%	favored French participation
17%	opposed French participation

⁴⁵In relation to this, we may mention Dr. M. Schneider's article, "Problemen rondom de internationale berichtgeving" (Problems of International News Service), *Internationale Spectator*, I, pp. 179-92.

⁴⁶Sondages, *op. cit.*, pp. 167-68.

⁴⁷*Ibid.*, p. 170.

⁴⁸Manifestations et mesure de l'opinion publique, pp. 78-79.

23% reserved their opinion

100%

Here we have an outstanding phenomenon: the decrease of ignorance considerably reinforces the ranks of the supporters of European unification. In the above poll, their proportions increased from 46% to 60%, whereas the proportion of opponents increased only from 14% to 17%.

Other polls made by the same institute corroborate this phenomenon. In France in May, 1957, a poll on Euratom gave the results shown in Table II. These figures also support the conclusion that a favorable opinion prevails among the best informed.⁴⁷

Alain Girard has written, "Generally, sympathy toward the CECA, the Common Market, the European Defense Community project, as with the European union in general, is stronger among men than women, among the privileged classes than among the farmers and workers, and regularly increases with the level of education, often in a ratio of two to one and sometimes higher. Age plays no role and youth is not carried away by new enthusiasms. . . . The construction of Europe thus seems to be an intellectual matter in which the motives of the heart count very little."⁴⁸

Gérard Herberichs

Reflections on the Nature of Economic Power

Many voices have been heard on the nature and definition of power. Jean Lhomme, a French economist, here derives a carefully structured definition of economic power, synthesizing and criticizing analyses by German, French and American writers. He defines power in general and carefully distinguishes between power and force. The core of his argument is an analysis of the material elements of economic power, which are number, resources and organization, and the non-material elements, consciousness of force and consciousness of cohesion. His concluding definition is that "economic power is the conscious ability to transform a force into action, in order to make economic action more nearly a determinate action."

This article first appeared in *REVUE ÉCONOMIQUE*, #6 (November, 1958), pp. 859-95, under the title, "Considérations sur le pouvoir économique et sa nature." It was translated by T. H. Stevenson, editorial consultant, formerly of Michigan College of Mining and Technology.

INTRODUCTORY COMMENTS

I. This is not a lengthy dissertation on "power" in general. A host of discussions have shown that this concept is complex and elusive, and that economists can draw real profit from a discussion only if it has a specific purpose and carefully defined limits. This condition is seldom filled. Sometimes authors wander off on the path of romanticism;¹ or sometimes, when speaking of power, without making any additional qualification, they mean only political power, or else they confuse it with other powers, which should in fact be carefully distinguished, such as economic power, social power and others.²

This is our definition of power: in the widest sense, power is the conscious ability to exercise a net influence. Some

notes on the terms used in this definition are necessary.

(1) "Ability." In speaking of economic power, there must be a precise distinction between potentiality and action.

(2) "Conscious" ability. A power that is not conscious would not be a true power. This is the entire difference between power and domination, according to F. Perroux.³

(3) "Influence" may be exercised in many realms: the political, the economic, the social, the artistic, the religious and others. Qualifications appear below, in the study of the particular nature of economic power.

(4) Finally, "net" influence. This term expresses an idea related to the "disymmetry" discussed by F. Perroux.⁴ We argue that, assuming the presence of two

¹Cf., for example, G. Ferrero, *Pouvoir. Les génies invisibles de la Cité* (1945), a work as impassioned as it is impassioned.

²Such is the case with authors who for other reasons are interesting. For example, Alfred Poé (*Philosophie du pouvoir*, 1948), Labasse ("Démocratie et Pouvoir," *Economie et Humanisme*, March-April, 1953, p. 57), Lasswell and Kaplan (*Power and Society: a Framework for Social Enquiry*, 1950) and M. Byé ("Le Pouvoir économique," *Cahiers du Travail*, October, 1950).

³In his article, "Esquisse d'une théorie de l'économie dominante" (*Economie appliquée*, 1948), F. Perroux makes it clear (p. 245) that he is speaking only of the effect of domination in the realm of economics. He adds (p. 248) that this effect is exercised by A on B, "regardless of any particular intent by A." For him, therefore, the effect of domination may be either conscious or unconscious; it operates in a rather mechanical fashion.

⁴Cf. the article cited above. An American writer, Robert K. Merton, hit upon the same idea as F. Perroux and expressed it in almost the same terms; Merton states that "interpersonal influence implies an asymmetric relation" ("A Study of Interpersonal Influence and of Communication Behavior in a Local Community," in Lazarsfeld and Stanton, eds., *Communications Research*, 1949, p. 208).

influences, influences *a* belonging to A and influence *b* belonging to B, A exercises his power over B if *a* is greater than *b*, that is, if *a* minus *b* is positive. Only the balance, the remainder, is important; the essential fact is not that a reaction follows an action, but that the reaction is quantitatively less than the action. Thence arises the idea of a "net" influence.

II. Power in general having been defined, though in a summary and schematic fashion, there still remains the task of defining *economic* power. Clearly, this could not be accomplished by adding an adjective to the preceding definition, saying that "*economic* power is the conscious ability to exercise a net *economic* influence." Though not inaccurate, such a definition is imprecise. Our first step in defining economic power is to consider two other interpretations, the first of which links economic power with the ability to restrain and the second of which links it with force.

Maurice Byé,⁵ having defined power in general as "the ability to restrain" adds that all power typically seeks an end (spiritual, temporal, etc.). Political power is the ability to restrain for political ends; economic power, the ability to restrain for economic ends; and so on. Moreover, the means are adapted for each end. For instance, economic power will use economic means such as, under capitalism, the price mechanism.

M. Byé apparently has been more or less consciously influenced by observations formulated by jurists, who quite often identify power, without qualification, as political power. M. Byé does not go so far as to interpret economic life in terms of legal penalties;⁶ he sees other instruments of restraint besides the instruments of law, for he cites examples borrowed from the market and the price

mechanism. Yet he retains a considerable part of the juridical concept; economic power to him has only one form, that of restraint. In our opinion, there are two objections to this view.

The less important objection is purely formal: it is troublesome, for the sake of definition, to rely upon a negative or secondary element. Restraint appears in that guise, implying a prior resistance that there is reason for overcoming. In this sense, restraint is in no way primary; it is but a reaction. It would be better to consider the action itself as a point of departure.

The other objection is much stronger because it is less formal. It is incorrect to regard an action or influence as exerting itself from the outset with the aim of restraining. Restraint certainly has importance, if only from the psychological point of view and as an eventuality, but there are no grounds for making it the essence of power. Let us consider, for example, a power (economic) operating in the realm of prices in the form of a cartel. The cartel exercises its rule over a certain number of manufacturers, let us say 20. Why begin with the implicit hypothesis that all 20 manufacturers will resist? This is by no means certain. Perhaps 19 manufacturers will obey the orders they have given themselves and the resistance will be the act of only one. So far as the first 19 are concerned, there is no need of restraint. Only in the case of the twentieth manufacturer, the sole recalcitrant, will power assume its guise of restraint, and there is no basis for the notion that it has the same character with respect to all.

To summarize, the most objectionable aspect of the concept in question is that in giving so much emphasis to restraint it tends to depict economic power as something *residual*, *contingent* and *sup-*

⁵Byé, *loc. cit.*, p. 2. Cf. also "Vers un quatrième pouvoir," by this author, in G. Gurvitch, ed., *Industrialisation et Technocratie*, 1949, pp. 63 ff. Berle defines power in much the same way as M. Byé: "Ability to lead others, by restraint, to act in certain fields of behavior" (*Le Capital américain et la Conscience du roi*, 1954, Fr. trans., 1957, p. 21).

⁶As did the legislator in the revolutionary epoch, thus complying with the then predominant opinion. It is striking how the economic regulation of that time continually assumed a penal aspect. Prices, for instance, almost exclusively gave reason for measures intended to repress "speculation." Under such a regime, the police officer becomes the chief instrument of all economic policy.

plementary. Though restraint is one of the attributes of economic power, it is not its essence.

III. Is the essence of economic power to be found in force? Certain writers have thought so. For them, of course, it is a force whose nature is economic, just as power itself. It is still necessary to be specific. Let us reject from the beginning all excessive and arbitrary interpretations⁷ and limit ourselves to those that merit discussion.

G. E. Lavau makes an interesting effort to draw certain necessary distinctions. He begins by defining power in general: "Power is force, plus law; it is a social force that has been institutionalized and legalized."⁸ He then goes on to distinguish between political power and economic power.

But what is the economic power? Analysis shows only some economic forces, which are quite different and give birth to many antinomies, such as that between capital and labor. Henceforth economic power is an abstraction, which is false so long as contradictions of this nature remain. Defined in the realm of the concrete, economic power "is, at a given time and in a given place, the combination of dominating forces that direct the economy." There is always relativity of the various powers vis-à-vis social groups, and economic power is not, for example, the wholly ideal combination of capital and labor. As long as one of them occupies a dominant position, that one alone is a power. The other remains a "non-power."⁹

We will not emphasize the repetition in the proposed definition: "dominating" forces that "direct" the economy (unless the author intended to speak solely

of "principal forces"?). The remaining ideas are a combination, perhaps temporary, and a combination of several forces. The first idea appears admissible and expresses a well-known fact; the relatively of power in time and space. The second is much more controversial: can power be reduced to forces? If so, what is the nature of these forces?

We find some exactitude on this point in the work of von Wieser, who states that all power presupposes force as a basis.¹⁰ When consciousness perceives the effects of force, will and feeling are aroused and begin to function. The validity of the distinction between force and power is shown by the "law of small number": in effect, the many as a mass may well exert very great force. However, there are only a very few among them that achieve power (at least economic power, the only one with which von Wieser is concerned).

Robert Bierstedt, an American sociologist, has dealt excellently with this problem. He sets forth three propositions. Concerning the first two, force appears to Bierstedt to correspond to the limitation, or even elimination, of alternatives of action, by one person or group of persons in regard to another person or group of persons. The alternatives are reduced to two in the case symbolized by the formula, "Your money or your life," and are eliminated entirely in an instance in which a judicial decision is executed.¹¹

As for power itself, it is a prior ability making the application of force possible. The important factor is not the actual use of force but the ability to use it by virtue of authority, "the ability to introduce force into a social act."

⁷For example, that of E. T. Hiller (*Social Relations and Structures*, 1947), who sees nothing in the use of economic power except *unfair competition* (p. 167). This entirely negative view would lead to explaining everything by violence and fraud.

⁸Lavau, *loc. cit.*, p. 817. The author is clearly influenced by the concepts of public law. Where we have placed a consciousness, he places a statute. The power of which he is speaking is, in fact, a political power. We shall lay no more stress on this critique.

⁹*Ibid.*, pp. 818-19.

¹⁰Das *Gesetz der Macht* (1926). Cf. especially the paragraph "Kraft und Macht," pp. 16-17. Power is thus something other than force.

¹¹These expressions, which seem faulty to us, are those of Bierstedt himself, in "An Analysis of Social Power," *American Sociological Review*, December, 1950, p. 733.

Thus power denotes a force that *may* be applied; it presupposes an authority that *is* applied. Hence it is neither force nor authority, but in a sense their synthesis. Bierstedt clearly revives the Aristotelian distinction between potentiality and act, and we shall express it in terms imitating his: *power is a potential force; force is an active power.*

In his third proposition, Bierstedt defines authority as an institutionalized power. This definition need not detain us, for it is of little significance to us whether or not economic power is institutionalized.

To conclude these first considerations, we shall avoid identifying force with economic power. Force is still an element, a basis, of economic power; but *it is not* economic power. The characteristic of economic power that is above and beyond force is *consciousness of a potential force*. It is a question of an ability or a faculty, as we have carefully set forth in proposing a definition for power "in general." But hitherto the problem has been little more than circumscribed and delimited. Certain faulty comparisons have had to be discarded. The essence of the difficulty remains.

* * * 12

THE ELEMENTS OF ECONOMIC POWER

We might retain several of the preceding ideas regarding economic power as related to economic law without accepting in entirety the harsh criticisms currently directed against the theory of "voluntarism." In particular, an objection of A. Nicolai¹³ is completely valid: the "voluntarist" theory of *bargaining power* contains a shortcoming; it does not indicate what causes make (or unmake) power. This criticism is, in our eyes, fundamental, and *no theory of economic power merits attention so long as it has not given the necessary data on this major point*. It remains to fill


this gap. This we shall attempt to do, but first we propose to limit the field of discussion.

The Operation of Economic Power

Assume two economic units, A and B (e.g., two business firms, farmers' associations, interest groups, etc.). Firm A is going to wield its power over firm B, for instance in the area of price. That is, the action of power will have the effect of compelling firm B to adopt, at least in part,¹⁴ the solution, with regard to a given price, chosen by firm A. Thus, from the outset the plans of A and B conflict.

Next, action of firm A limits the courses of action open to firm B. In other words, the field in which firm B may exercise its initiative is henceforth restricted. This is what Bierstedt called "reduction of alternatives," as noted above. Ultimately, B would be forced to take the only course of action left open to it; however, since power denotes a *net influence*, we must exclude from the hypothesis the case in which the power of A would be imposed entirely upon B, leaving it no choice and making it incapable of an independent reaction.

This is illustrated in the figure below. Firms A and B are situated with respect



to each other so that the area of initial possible actions of B is represented by the largest circle, with radius EC, which

¹²Editor's note: a lengthy section on economic power and economic law at this point in the original article is omitted.

¹³Comportement économique et Structures sociales (law thesis, typewritten copy, Paris, 1957), p. 489.

¹⁴In part, since the two actions are not equivalent, by virtue of the hypothesis itself. If the action of A induced from B a reaction exactly equal to the action there would be an absolute equilibrium and nothing would result.

corresponds to a certain price that B would perhaps receive if the action of power did not evidence itself. But power is evidenced on the part of firm A. Thus the "net influence" may be expressed as *EC* minus *ED* equals *CD*. This is the measure of the power of A, since *CD* is the quantity by which *EC* has been diminished owing to the intervention of firm A. The area of indeterminacy is reduced, yet not abolished.¹⁵

The Material Elements of Economic Power

Clearly, the above presentation serves only to establish ideas. Alone, it resolves nothing and must be complemented by the determination of the *causes* or *elements* of power. Once again it should be pointed out that this is a question of *power*, not solely of economic *force* (often termed contractual force), which we decided forms only the basis of power.

Many have tried to resolve this question. Spengler names three elements of power: number, organization and consciousness.¹⁶ Bierstedt also names three: number, organization and resources. R. Barre names three series of elements: technical (ability of the seller to stockpile, of the buyer to wait); financial (ability to restrain the competitor by means of assets or income); and psychological (ability to bluff, to hold out the last quarter of an hour).¹⁷ Finally, A. Tiano also speaks of several series: objective elements (the state of affairs, financial reserves); subjective elements (the psychology of opponents); aptitude for negotiation; and ability to grasp the state of mind of the other party.¹⁸

None of these classifications is poor, yet none is entirely satisfactory. Certain circumstances, peculiar to the subject of the contract or the conflict, can alter

strategies. Thus the dealer in perishable commodities may be unable to wait longer than a certain time to sell his merchandise. As for labor itself, if one tries to regard it as a "merchandise," one finds that it cannot be stockpiled by the worker who supplies it.

With this understood, the following classification of the material and non-material elements of power may permit avoiding the disadvantages of the preceding classifications. The material elements may be synthesized by grouping them under the name of "force," the basis of power. There are three: number, resources and organization.

(1) Number is of great importance; it suffices to mention the instance of salaried persons, consumers, etc. It might be mentioned that a *large* number rarely acts on its own initiative, but most often relies on a few—as in workmen's crews, cartels and unions. Number thus functions as a support for force, just as force functions as a support for power. Spengler gives number its proper place by saying that number "should be strategically distributed in the economy."¹⁹ Concentration in one region, in one vital sector of the economy such as transportation or communication, comprises an element of force.

(2) Resources should be interpreted in a very wide sense; they include money, credit, plant, technical competence, manufacturing secrets, etc. Of course, none of these elements constitutes power, but power stems from their combination with other elements—number and organization. One may note that under various circumstances resources can balance number; a labor union can rely upon number, but its resources are usually limited (in France, at least). On the other hand, an employers' association

¹⁵A. Nicolai has noted that the figure would remain static, and proposed the substitution of another figure, inspired by that of Lindhal (*Etudes sur la théorie de la monnaie et du capital*, 1939, Fr. trans. with preface by André Marchal, 1950, p. 39), which would have the advantage of giving a dynamic presentation of the same ideas.

¹⁶"Economic Power Blocs and American Capitalism," *American Economic Review*, XL, 1950, pp. 415-16.

¹⁷*Economie politique* (coll. "Thémis," 1956) I, p. 492.

¹⁸*L'Action syndicale ouvrière et la Théorie économique du salaire* (1958), p. 84.

¹⁹Spengler, *loc. cit.*, p. 415.

is generally rich, and thus can counter-balance its small membership.

We must especially emphasize another advantage for associations, firms and unions, that results from the resources they control: *they have the ability to make optimum use of time*. The strong firm can usually reduce its delay in acting (and the delay in reaction by the weak firm). It is better equipped to perform swiftly an action of power, for it possesses a stock of resources not only more extensive but also more varied than those of the weak firm. The latter might, for instance, have to create a service or make a new study, whereas the strong firm already has the needed service or has prepared the study.

(3) Organization is the last of the material elements. It should be noted that G. Gurvitch distinguishes between organized groups and structured groups; he makes structure a genus of which organization is a species.²⁰ We shall retain only the species, that is, organization.

Organization is essential, especially at the higher and middle levels. Through it, small, well-organized groups can dominate the numerous masses; this is the situation in many labor unions. Nevertheless the masses retain eventual, "residual" power, according to Bierstedt; though they may undergo subjection for a long time, if at some time they organize themselves (out of weariness or ill-feeling), they can overthrow the domination. This is the eternal problem of the contact that must be maintained with the base, in unions and parties. If the contact is broken the "bosses" are toppled, though they doubtless will be replaced by other bosses.

As a final comment, organization often becomes more stable as it becomes older. This has been proved, even in societies

such as ours in which the impact of traditions seems to be steadily diminishing. The force of inertia maintains existing organizations as if they held their place by right. If British trade unions are more stable than French workers' associations, it is chiefly because they are older. However, the age of an organization may be an element of weakness; the organization suffers from hardening of the tissues, and at last people become aware that it is sclerosed. This awareness scarcely ever comes save during revolutionary periods, when the organism no longer has time to rebuild itself.

Non-material Elements

The non-material elements of economic power can also be grouped under one word, consciousness. Our definition of power in general was "the *conscious* ability to exercise a net influence." It is necessary to consider the content of consciousness in regard to economic power; we maintain that it comprises the consciousness of a certain force and the further consciousness of a certain cohesion.

Concerning *consciousness of a certain force*, the non-material elements examined above must reach the level of consciousness (individual or collective); they must be used in view of predetermined goals by a will that cannot be identified simply with reflexes or external forces. It is this conscious state that, added to the force itself, creates true power. (Cf. the formula proposed above, after Bierstedt, that force is a "manifest" power in action.)

Consciousness must of course be distinguished from knowledge. Information, depending upon whether or not it is well-founded, leads to accurate or erroneous knowledge. In each case it produces effects, the sole difference being that if the information is erroneous

²⁰*Vocation actuelle de la sociologie* (2nd ed., 1957), *passim* and especially p. 305. The author gives as examples: groupings neither structured nor organized—a public, the unemployed; groupings structured, but unorganized—the classes; groupings structured and partially organized—families, religious confraternities; finally, groupings structured and completely organized—certain unions, certain political parties. He notes that organization, which is sometimes too rigid, is not necessarily a sign of stability; this was the case of the Fascist syndicates, and still is the case for certain learned societies.

it yields bad results.

Again, it is apparent that the firm that already possesses material force has even more advantages over the weak firm in the matter of possible errors. As one eventually, it may be that the consequences of these errors will be less severe for it, though the reverse may also occur. Somewhat more likely, it may be that the very magnitude of its material forces will give it more ability to rectify its errors. Finally, and most important, it may be that the strong firm is in a position to make its own errors triumph.

The *consciousness of a certain cohesion* between the interests concerned comprises the other non-material element of economic power. Of course, the problem of significant cohesion does not arise when the power under consideration is that of one individual. On the other hand, it does arise and becomes very serious when one examines the exercise of power by a group. The group must then realize that it represents a clearly defined sector of the economy; therein lies an element of discipline.²¹ It is thus for salaried employees, together defending their salaries; for manufacturers, together seeking to conquer a market. Still, cohesion is weak and uncertain among such groups as consumers and the "middle classes"; among the latter are outright antagonisms, as between bondholders and small merchants, for example. Thence arises the paucity of cohesion among such groups, their paucity of common consciousness, the paucity of their achievements and, finally, their paucity of power.

Where it exists, cohesion is expressed by similarities of behavior: the same reactions to a given event, the same pose of defense before a given danger, the same obedience to instructions and watchwords. Spengler adds that cohesion is especially strong at the lower levels; thus it differs from the material element, organization, the necessity of

²¹Spengler, *loc. cit.*, pp. 415-16.

which, as noted, is above all evident at the upper levels.

It should be noted that there is no reason for concern with the inherent value of a stable cohesion. The essentials are the existence of the bond and the fact that it is perceived. The importance of the role played in this realm by "myths" may be cited; thus, workers defending a given salary level have many interests that are common and that are perceived as such. But particular circumstances can give birth to common trends of opinion that end by giving an enhanced role to elements that are transitory; such is the case of refugees and the victims of cataclysms, for example. And likewise, clever propaganda sometimes succeeds in inflating the value of elements having little objective value; one may contest the logical basis of a slogan such as "the victims of taxation," but one cannot contest the success of the campaign conducted on so fragile a base. The political situation in France in 1956-57 provided decisive proof in that respect.

In summary, economic power appears to rest, on the one hand, upon a combination of material elements (force) represented by number, resources, and organization; and on the other hand upon a combination of non-material elements—the consciousness of that force, and also the consciousness (when a group is involved) of the cohesion of the combined interests.

CONCLUSIONS

Some Prevailing Ideas

It is necessary to reach a conclusion out of the many foregoing concepts, theories and interpretations. To do so, it is necessary to separate certain prevailing ideas from the controversies. We shall borrow the first from W. Eucken, who has best indicated the direction of the effort to provide a verifiable solution.

"Power is only a word." Yet one can not be satisfied with the indiscrimi-

nate use of the word, or of speaking simply of a power such as that of capitalism. What is necessary is that the reality of the economic phenomenon that power constitutes be made evident. Real content must be attributed to the terms "power," "struggle for power." "Economic power is not at all irrational or mystical. It is something rationally comprehensible, rationally attainable."²² We hope we have replied to these demands in a satisfactory manner by defining as clearly as possible the elements of economic power.

The second idea is that purely violent solutions are tantamount to changing the economic system itself. However, a group cannot hope to impose *any* conceivable solution; the solution must be compatible with the existing system. If not, there is a "rebuilding of structure," as F. Perroux has viewed it.²³ Thus, without upholding the theory of complete determinacy, we feel able to set limits on indeterminacy.

The third idea is that of the integration of the economy into one whole. Here we assume some (though not all) of the ideas of Morgenstern, who stresses the interdependence of all measures of economic intervention. Reciprocally, however, each economic intervention comprises an interference with the whole social structure of power, which introduces a new element of uncertainty into the economic polity.²⁴

This idea seems worthy of retention. Economic power cannot be isolated from the other powers save by an operation of the mind, an operation doubtless necessary as a starting point. In reality, however, an exact view of economic power can be obtained only if it is restored to its social surroundings and to the economic system in which it wields its action.

²²All these citations are from W. Eucken, *Die Grundlagen der Nationalökonomie* (6th ed., 1950), pp. 203-04.

²³F. Perroux, *Le Néo-Marginalisme* (1941), p. 164.

²⁴O. Morgenstern, *The Limits of Economics* (Eng. trans., 1937, a revised and augmented version of the 1934 German edition), pp. 71-72.

Attempt to Reach a Definition of Economic Power

Economic power is not to be confused with either restraint or force. It implies material elements (a potential force) and non-material elements (a will conscious of using force so as to turn it into an action). Thus the realm of indeterminacy can be reduced to the extent to which—in order to avoid the problem of "voluntarism"—we have fixed the causes or factors that give rise to both the material elements and the non-material elements of power, all, of course, being economic in nature.

In these terms, one might define economic power as "the ability to exercise a net economic influence"; but it would be necessary to broaden this formula and make certain clarifications to explain the economic nature of the influence in question.

(1) Such ability necessarily is exercised within the framework of a given economic system; in other words, there are different types of economic power according to the type of system involved, e.g., an economy directed from a center or a decentralized economy.

(2) The ability must be interrelated with all other actions operating in the social milieu; in other words, it cannot be considered in isolation, no more in principle than in effect.

We propose the following definition, which unites the preceding statements in a coherent whole.

Economic power is the conscious ability to transform a force into an action, in order to make economic action more nearly a determinate action.

With respect to the definition of power in general, certain comments on the above formula can be made. We might have added the phrase, ". . . in order to make of economic action an action less indeterminate," implying

"than if power did not come into play." Perhaps that presentation would have had the advantage of stressing the relative character of the actions of power, but it would have had the disadvantage of forming a sort of paraphrase and of being complicated by a double negative.

We believe, however, that we demonstrated with sufficient clarity the *relative* character of the actions of power in stating "conscious ability to transform a force into an action, in order to make economic action *more nearly* a determinate action." The term indicates that it is solely a question of a tendency, and suggests that absolute determinacy will never be achieved. If it were, one would be abandoning hypothesis. There would be suppression or absorption of the weak firm by the strong firm, and the latter would no longer exercise true power.

The most difficult term, "determinate" action, remains to be interpreted. It might be objected that it is somewhat imprecise.²⁵ Is it a question of "determinacy" for the one who ob-

serves economic reality after the fact? This observer then notes that many elements—including chance—have intervened to extend the *effective* realm of the indeterminate.

There is one possible answer. What we have taken into consideration in order to define economic power is only the prior action of the economic agent, businessman or otherwise. The results might be examined from another point of view. But the objective of the economic agent consists in that he seeks to reduce, to limit, the realm of the indeterminate. All his strategy is designed to achieve that objective. That the goal may not always be reached, or may be reached in an imperfect fashion, that the strategy sometimes may be clearly inadequate—no one denies such possibilities. But that is another question, relative to the *effects* of economic power, and in the preceding pages we have had no other aims that seek its nature.

Jean Lhomme

²⁵The objection was made to me by A. Nicolai, whom I thank as well as those among his fellows who participated with him in my seminar (1957-58) at the *Ecole pratique des Hautes Etudes*. I cannot say too strongly how much their remarks and criticisms have stimulated me.

IN THE NEWS

continued from p. 2

SPECIAL PROGRAMS: At Boston U. a *Communications Research Center* has been established within the School of Public Relations & Communications; the new center is directed by E. J. Robinson. * * * Boston U. has also received \$425M contract from International Cooperation Administration to train agency personnel in its African research and studies program for 3 years. * * * American U. School of International Service and the *Business Council for International Understanding* announced training program for overseas business execs., 6 groups to be trained this year, 25 per group. * * * New *Committee on Intercultural Colleges & Universities* will be headed by G. N. Shuster, financed by Hazen F., & will consider extent to which American institutions concern themselves with study of non-Western world.

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT: Federal Student Loan Fund has \$30 million for '59-'60, expects 121,000 students to apply (out of 2,200,000 students at 1,372 participating institutions). Institutions requested \$41.5 million. Harvard rejected loans because of oaths required. * * * The Selden Passport Control Bill as passed by Congress largely follows existing practice under Supreme Court rulings, but provides judicial review of passport denial; if State Dept. refuses to disclose material relating to a denial & if denial is not justified without such disclosure, a passport must be issued.

The Law of Outer Space

The Soviet author somewhat repetitiously discusses the concepts of airspace and national sovereignty in the space age. He summarizes the opinions of a number of Western authorities on international law and notes that most of them agree with the Soviet view that state sovereignty does not extend to outer space. Certain official Soviet views and proposals concerning airspace violations, state security and the exploration of space are presented.

This article originally appeared in *SOVETSKOE GOSUDARSTVO I PRAVO*, July, 1958, pp. 52-58. It was translated by Andrew Janos, whose note follows the article.

The splendid results of the creative work of Soviet science and technology, which recently opened up a new period in mankind's conquest of interplanetary space, have at the same time created a number of problems in the field of international law.

The principal legal question created by the launching of artificial earth satellites is whether the sovereignty of the territorial state extends to interplanetary space to the same extent as sovereignty extends over the airspace above national territory. If the sovereignty of the state does not extend to interplanetary space, which thus can be considered as *res communis* similar to the open seas, the next question is where this free space begins and whether a physical formula based on the density of air or something else should be accepted as a guiding principle for the determination of the upper limit of sovereignty.

International lawyers can argue about many more questions, such as liability for damages caused by the possible crash of a satellite, the regulation of radio-wave frequencies transmitted from a mechanism or instrument launched into the outer space, the right to intercept radio signals and use meteorological information made available through such launchings, and the regulation of traffic in outer space to avoid the collision of satellites. Finally, there are

questions of the legal rights of states that succeed in reaching the surface of the moon, the announcement of any legal claims, including legal claims of possession for outer space by states that have launched sputniks, and so forth.¹

First of all, let us give some consideration to the question as to whether the sovereignty of states can be extended to interplanetary space or not.

The two fundamental international agreements on the matter of air rights—the Paris Convention of 1919 and the Chicago Convention of 1944—leave no doubt about the right of a state "for complete and exclusive sovereignty over airspace above its territory." However, the term "airspace" was not defined in these conventions or in any other legal documents or authoritative adjudications, and this gap gave rise to various interpretations by international lawyers. Some have interpreted "airspace" as a concept unrelated to altitude. Thus the French professor Roger Saint-Alary refers to the Chicago convention, saying that this convention failed to define the upper limits of airspace, and further states that "sovereignty of states practically extends to all space that can be utilized for the purposes of mankind" and the word airspace should not be interpreted in the strict sense but so as to "include stratospheric or, in some future time, even exospheric space."²

¹Concerning these questions, see Horsford, C., "The Law of Space." *Journal of the British Interplanetary Society*, XIV (#3, '55).

²Saint-Alary, Roger. *Le droit aérien*. Paris: 1955, p. 66.

The English authors Shawcross and Beaumont call our attention to the fact that none of these international legal theories concerning legal rights of states for their airspace "has ever been contested or recognized by an international tribunal." Therefore, their argument runs, in every case where sovereignty of a state over its airspace is disputed, the doctrine of complete sovereignty should be applied, in the absence of international agreements to other effects. Concluding their argument, they point out that an international tribunal may interpret the word "complete" to mean "without limit" or, consequently, one "that has no upper limit." However, the authors conclude that if a spacecraft passes the stratosphere at a given height and with a given speed, then, considering the rotation of the earth, the physical properties of the stratosphere and the theory of relativity, it is not possible to judge whether the spacecraft crossed the "imaginary vertical borders of the airspace of a country."³

An American, Professor Cooper, considers the extension of sovereignty permissible either by international agreement or by "unilateral force" above areas in which aircraft and balloons can be used. He also points out that "there is certainly no basis on which any customary international law can as yet be considered applicable to such higher areas."⁴

The majority of legal authorities, however, is definitely of the opinion that, regulated by the Paris-Chicago Conventions, the right of states cannot be extended to areas much higher than that. Thus the Englishman, Horsford, declares: ". . . it will be seen at once that these regulations are not only in-

adequate but largely inapplicable to the new and vast medium into which our studies must be directed. . . All operations in space will be conducted so far above what is now accepted as the airspace above a nation's territory, and so impossible will it be to observe any limitations of a territorial nature such as frontiers demand, that it is in the law of the sea that the answer would seem to lie."⁵

Another English international lawyer, Jenks, confirms the theory that national sovereignty cannot be extended to space beyond the atmosphere of the earth. "Any projection of territorial sovereignty into space beyond the atmosphere would be inconsistent with the basic astronomical facts. The revolution of the earth on its own axis, its rotation around the sun, and the planets through the galaxy all require that the relationship of particular sovereignties on the surface of the earth to space beyond the atmosphere is never constant for the smallest conceivable time."⁶ By this reason, the space that in one moment is above France, may be above Japan in the next.

The German international lawyer, Meyer, writes as follows: "It seems quite impossible to extend the states' sovereignty into outer space. In addition to the fact that the exercise of such sovereignty in outer space cannot be effective, it seems impossible to fix an area in outer space that corresponds to the territory of a state on the earth. The enormous distance between the surface of the earth and outer space makes it impossible to state whether an event occurring in the outer space has occurred just above a certain state of the earth."⁷ However, Meyer emphasizes that space flights, although not subject

³Shawcross and Beaumont, "Vozdushnoye Pravo" (Air Law), IL, 1957, pp. 92-93.

⁴Cited in Hogan, *American Journal of International Law*, No. 2, 1957, p. 364.

⁵Cited in the *American Journal of International Law*, No. 2, 1957, p. 366. This author considers the principle of the freedom of the open seas.

⁶Jenks, W. *Droit international et activités dans l'espace*. 1956. Cited in *Journal of Air Law and Commerce*, XXIV (#3, '57), p. 290; also cited in *Maclean's Canada's National Magazine*, January 18, 1958, p. 43.

⁷*American Journal of International Law*, No. 2, 1957, p. 365.

to the rules of customary international law, must be subject to some kind of regulation to enforce the safety of spacecrafts and human beings.

There is general agreement that thus far there have been no established definitions as to what airspace is, though it frequently appears in international agreements and in the domestic law of states (the same term is used in Article 1 of the Soviet Air-Code: "To the USSR belongs the full and exclusive sovereignty in the airspace over the USSR."). Thus, various authors have felt the need for a more precise definition, either substituting a different term for it or suggesting upper limits. There are some who have advanced the so-called "zone theory." Thus, in a document made available to the members of ICAO (International Civil Aviation Organization), Professor Cooper makes the following suggestions: (1) to reaffirm the Chicago Convention of 1944, giving the subjacent state full sovereignty in the areas of the atmospheric space above it, up to heights where aircraft, as now defined, may operate, such areas being designated "territorial space"; (2) to extend the sovereignty of the subjacent state upward to 300 miles above the earth's surface, designating this second region as "contiguous space,"⁸ and to provide for a right of transit through this zone for all non-military devices, when ascending or descending; (3) to accept the principle that all space above "contiguous space" is free for the passage of all such mechanical contrivances.⁹

Some international lawyers are critical of this "zone theory." Meyer points out that the situation of the air and outer space is quite different from the situation on the earth. Between air-

plane and outer space no determined boundary exists; the air has the particular quality of gradually becoming thinner and thinner. Therefore, he thinks, creating a "contiguous zone" in outer space is of dubious theoretical value.¹⁰ Jenks thinks the Cooper plan impracticable.¹¹ Cooper's views on "zoning" are not shared by the President of the International Astronautic Association, nor by Hailey.¹²

These representative opinions clearly show that there is no working definition or convention concerning airspace, and this is admittedly the standpoint of both Western and People's Democratic international lawyers. McDougal, an American lawyer, writes, "With respect to outer space it seems clear that there are no existing relevant conventional prescriptions."¹³ The Polish Makovsky noted, "Presently there are no legal norms that would permit the definition of the legal status of rockets or satellites launched into the outer space. . . . It is a fact that rockets, satellites and other spacecraft are not subject to the regulations of any domestic law or international regulation. Also, there are no regulations for the space beyond the atmosphere in which these vehicles fly."¹⁴ To quote the metaphor of Katz on the present state of space law, this branch of legal knowledge is like "a pot boiling with the guesses and reflections of speculating international lawyers."¹⁵

However, this absence of binding conventions is ample proof in itself that every state has the right to use the interplanetary space, that there is no restriction on launching satellites and rockets, nor is it necessary to get the permission or consent of other states to such launchings. At this point, we have to remember that it was the Soviet

⁸Other authorities advocate 300-600 miles, e.g., see Katz in *Maclean's Canada's National Magazine*.

⁹Hogan, *op. cit.*, p. 363.

¹⁰Cf. *Journal of Air Law and Commerce*, *op. cit.*, p. 301.

¹¹Cf. *Maclean's Canada's National Magazine*, *op. cit.*, p. 43.

¹²*Journal of Air Law and Commerce*, *op. cit.*, p. 301.

¹³*American Journal of International Law*, No. 1, 1957, pp. 75-76.

¹⁴"W 50 lecie naukowej owej Juliana Makowskiego," Warsaw, 1957, pp. 169-70.

¹⁵*Maclean's Canada's National Magazine*, *op. cit.*, p. 15.

Union that first launched artificial satellites, with the purpose of conducting scientific research in accordance with the program of the International Geophysical Year. This program had been worked out by the scientists of many countries, who envisaged the use of technical devices, including artificial earth satellites. Thus the launching of earth satellites was a well-known plan as early as 1955. Yet no country registered any objections or counterproposals. To quote the opinion of Mr. Schachter, the Director of the General Legal Division of the United Nations, "There have been no protests from governments or other competent organs that the Russian satellites have violated their national sovereignty."¹⁶

But while discussing the absence of binding international regulations for the use of outer space we should not forget about the fundamental conventions of international law. A well-known convention of modern international law declares illegal any threat of force in international relations. This is also expressed by the United Nations Charter. Consequently, the use of outer space for such purposes would lack any legal basis. The "use of force" is as illegal in the outer space as it is in air, on land and sea. The chief effort of each U.N. member state must be to avert the danger of war. The exploitation of outer space for military purposes cannot be separated from other problems of disarmament. A ban restricted to outer space only, however, with a complete freedom to establish and use ground, sea and air bases on foreign territories, would not contribute to the lessening of international tensions. This would only be advantageous for states having military bases in foreign territories.

As has been pointed out in the preceding analysis, the occupation of outer space presents international lawyers

with a wide range of problems. There have been numerous efforts to resolve the problems presented. Reference has been made to the standpoint of the majority of Western international lawyers, who agree that state sovereignty does not extend to outer space. At the same time a variety of altitudes has been suggested as the upper limit of state sovereignty. Thus, for example, the Canadian Pépin suggests 50 miles; above that altitude the density of air is not sufficient for the use of conventional and commonly used aircraft. According to Meyer the jurisdiction of the states can be extended to the altitude between 124 and 187 miles. His views are supported by the fact that at this height there are still enough oxygen molecules to justify calling it airspace. Some meteorologists proceed from the same theoretical basis and argue that national sovereignty could be extended up to an altitude of 7000 miles.¹⁷

What criterion could be used as a basis for the determination of the upper limits of sovereignty? The controlling principle for us in this respect must be state security, as suggested by F. I. Kovalyev at the meeting of the Association of Soviet International Lawyers.¹⁸ One of the fundamental rights of a state is the right of self-protection, which originates from the doctrine of sovereignty. Respect for national sovereignty is the most important and generally recognized principle of international law. It is this principle of protecting the territory of the state, laid down in a number of international conventions, which explains the complete and exclusive sovereignty of a state in the airspace above its territory. Even the advocates of "air freedom" who have demanded free entry of foreign aircraft into the airspace of a state would admit the right of states to enforce regulations in their own ter-

¹⁶*Ibid.*, p. 43.

¹⁷*Ibid.*, p. 15.

¹⁸At the meeting of the Association of Soviet International Lawyers, Jan. 30-Feb. 1, 1958. See the communique published in *Mezhdunarodnaya Zbirny*, No. 3, 1958, p. 158.

ritory protecting the security of the state, private persons and objects.¹⁹

In this connection it is suitable to refer to the 1956 USSR notes protesting the launching of American balloons into Soviet airspace. At that time the United States official standpoint was that the balloons, which they called "miniature satellites," served the purpose of collecting meteorological data and "valuable scientific information" in connection with the realization of the program of the International Geophysical Year, and it was stated that their presence at high altitudes would not interfere with air transportation. At that time Dulles emphasized that there existed no international code regulating the use of space at such altitudes, and that it was very hard to determine the altitude over which a state could still claim jurisdiction.²⁰

Soviet protests were extended against balloons floating from the altitude of 4000-5000 meters up to 20,000 meters. Many of these were at altitudes used by transport and passenger planes, often because air currents brought them down to the flight altitudes of such planes. The balloons carried the maximum weight of 650 kg. and were equipped with mechanisms for meteorological research and aerophotographic reconnaissance instruments.²¹ The USSR had a clear reason to protest these flights because they endangered air transportation and the inhabited areas above which the planes were flying. The note of the Soviet government of February 4, 1956, was quite just in pointing out that "sending such balloons into the airspace of the Soviet Union with the described equipment designed by the American military authorities is itself a gross violation of Soviet airspace and a breach of generally recognized international legal principles according to

which every state has a complete sovereignty over the airspace above its national territory.

In accordance with this principle of national sovereignty there can be no transgression of the boundaries of national airspace without the permission of the state in question.²² Summarizing the approach advanced here, we are led to the logical conclusion that the upper limit of sovereignty must be drawn so that it should protect the state against violators of its territorial integrity and national independence. Concerning space beyond the atmosphere, which is not under the direct sovereign controls of the state, we would advance the principle, in the interest of stimulating scientific research, that no state should have the right to bring any part of outer space under its national jurisdiction.

The present essay is not to deal with the efforts of some international lawyers to answer questions arising from the exploitation of outer space. It is our conviction that these issues must be solved in the spirit of peaceful coexistence, taking into consideration the interests of both satellite launching states and other states. From this point of view, the proposal that the earth satellites should be marked with different signs seems highly reasonable. This would provide a basis for state liabilities for damages caused by an earth satellite falling back to earth. Equally reasonable is the proposal that an agreement should be reached concerning the frequencies of radio-transmitters operating on artificial satellites, because this would prevent confusion and disorder that might prevent states from receiving broadcasts from the satellites or locating them in outer space.

The next step would be to fix the property rights of launching states for

¹⁹Cf. Le Goff, M. *Manuel de droit aérien*. Paris: 1954, pp. 71-72.

²⁰*Pravda*, February 11, 1956. Also cf. the note of the USSR of February 8, 1956, in *Pravda*, February 19, 1956.

²¹Cf. material on the press conference of Soviet and foreign journalists, *Pravda*, February 10, 1956.

²²*Pravda*, February 6, 1956. See the text of the USSR note to the United States in *Pravda*, February 19, 1956.

the equipment of the spacecraft, so that in the event of a crash on the territory of a foreign state an obligation would exist to surrender instruments and mechanisms or their remnants to the launching state.

Last but not least, an agreement should be reached to the effect that these great discoveries—the occupation of interplanetary space—should serve peaceful aims and not aggressive military purposes. As pointed out by the Soviet government, "The future of mankind will depend on whether these scientific and technical achievements will be used for peaceful purposes to enhance human welfare or whether they will be used to further the armament race, which may one day change peace into a devastating war with the utilization of the most up-to-date weapons for mass extermination."²³

The Soviet government advanced concrete proposals to the effect that outer space should be used for peaceful purposes only, for the benefit of mankind. This document contained the following essential proposals:

(1) Banning the use of outer space for military purposes and the imposition on states of the obligation to

²³*Pravda*, March 16, 1956.

launch rockets into outer space only as previously approved by international programs.

(2) The liquidation of foreign military bases, first of all in Europe, the Middle and Far East, and in North Africa.

(3) International controls within the framework of the U.N. to supervise the agreements under (1) and (2).

(4) Vesting international cooperation for the study of outer space in a U.N. organ. This study program would involve working out an internationally coordinated program for the launching of intercontinental and space rockets for the purpose of studying outer space and supervision of the program, and the coordination of all national programs in the field of the exploration of outer space with the provision of all assistance and cooperation to the realization thereof.²⁴

The acceptance of these Soviet proposals would be a significant contribution in strengthening peace and widening international cooperation, in the field of exploration of outer space and in many other areas of human activity.

A. Galina

²⁴*Ibid.*

TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: The translator of this article, Andrew Janos, was formerly a translator and editor in a communist East European country. He comments, "The rather unsophisticated sentence construction and the logical bounces are the regular style of Soviet political writing, of which this article is an excellent example. It has a superficial scientific approach, while relevant political slogans are interjected. There are many repetitions, of words, of whole sentences, even of paragraphs, all to emphasize the importance of the actual political message. This style carries the vestiges of original Bolshevik communication: orally, in face-to-face situations.

"The article itself 'reviews' (to put it mildly) two English language articles in the *American Journal of International Law* and *Maclean's*. The only original contributions of the author are the few exhortations against the imperialists.

"The term 'point out' appears again and again. It is part of Bolshevik jargon. Whether you accept it or not is almost a matter of philosophical approach. Also, the word 'science' appears at least ten times ('legal science,' 'scientist,' 'legal science'), but since the word has a specific meaning in English, I substituted 'legal authorities' or similar terms."

The Italian Socialist Party and Political Participation

In this intriguing example of applied political research, Alessandro Pizzorno combines an analysis of the degree of mass participation in the Italian Socialist Party with proposals for reforming the party in keeping with traditional socialist principles. Focusing on the 33rd Conference of the party, he finds that low participation in pre-conference meetings permits party factions to engage in undemocratic manipulation. He believes that mass participation is necessary to achieve socialistic goals, for example, the control of economic policy, and attempts to answer those who argue that oligarchic party control is necessary and that the mass cannot effectively participate in political life.

The article first appeared in PASSATO E PRESENTE, # 7 (Jan.-Feb. 1959), pp. 961-69, under the title, "Partecipazione politica e controllo degli investimenti." It was translated by Elio Gianturco of Hunter College, New York City.

"THE DECADENCE OF THE LABOR MOVEMENT IS EXPRESSED IN THE OFFICIAL OPTIMISM OF ITS MEMBERS. IT SEEMS TO GROW WITH THE RUTHLESS CONSOLIDATION OF THE CAPITALISTIC WORLD. BUT ITS FOUNDERS HAVE NEVER TAKEN ITS SUCCESS FOR GRANTED, AND THROUGHOUT THEIR LIVES THEY HAVE NEVER CEASED POINTING OUT CERTAIN DISAGREEABLE TRUTHS TO THE LABOR ORGANIZATIONS."

T. W. ADORNO
Minima Moralia

At the 33rd Conference of the Italian Socialist Party (PSI), the problem of political participation was posited by Basso in two speeches. In the first, he noted that about two-thirds of the registered members of the party had failed to attend the local pre-conference meetings, and that in many areas absences had exceeded 90%. This charge was protested by the members of the conference, and was interpreted as a political maneuver. It was thought that Basso was attempting implicitly to invalidate the proportions of votes polled on three motions before the party, and,

as an argument in favor of his thesis, was advocating the introduction of a single, final motion. In his closing remarks, however, Basso rejected these suspicions and re-emphasized the importance of the phenomenon of absenteeism. "The percentages polled by each persuasion [party faction] do not give us any insight into the zone of silence that I mentioned and that continues to exert its weight, and we are still uncertain as to the true thought of the majority that did not vote." He invited the majority to reflect on the political meaning of this silence, "the significance of which none of us knows."¹

Was Basso correct in his appraisal? To obtain exact data, the figures in the minutes of the sectional meetings may be reexamined. We have done so for the city of Milan and its province. Of 28,112 registered voters, 6,663 attended sectional meetings, 23.7% of the total. In the city of Milan, 1,872 out of 8,746 registered voters attended, i.e., 21.4%. In the province, excluding Milan, out of 19,366 registered voters, 4,791 attended, or 24.7%.²

¹It is not sheer coincidence that a weekly like *L'Espresso* should have criticized these references in Basso's reply, having failed to grasp their theme of innovation. This insensitivity to the problems of mass participation is characteristic of those who perceive the political dispensation as developing in a framework that has, at most, three components: the party leaders, the technicians and administrators, and the intellectuals.

²We are not certain whether this 3% difference between the city of Milan and the province is statistically significant, or whether it could be inferred that political participation in the province is greater than in Milan itself. We suggest that the divergence is due to the different size of the sections. It appears that the smallest sections, most of which are outside the city, have proportionally greater par-

Although we cannot, *a priori*, consider participation at Milan as representative of national party participation, there are no particular reasons for assuming that there were significant variations. If this assumption is correct, as these data and other observations lead us to believe, and pre-conference participation of registered voters was about 20-25%, we estimate that the voters of the various factions of the PSI are as follows:

Nenni faction:

12-15% of registered voters

Vecchietti faction:

7- 8% of registered voters

Basso faction:

2- 3% of registered voters

Absent:

80% of registered voters

A study of data for the whole of Italy would enable us to draw other inferences, and to measure precisely the variations in attendance according to regions and federations, urban and rural areas, industrial and non-industrial areas, and, finally, to make correlations between the degree of participation and the measure of electoral success of the party in various areas. Such conclusions would be of importance for organizational purposes. More important, the party and the public opinion to which the party is responsible need to know and are entitled to know the exact state of participation by members in the political life that is actualized through the party. The four million electors of the PSI have a right to know in an official, institutional manner, on behalf of how many citizens and with the participation of how many citizens the policy of the representatives whom they have elected is decided.

The clarity of democratic life within a party is blurred by the pre-conference meeting rule according to which the various factions divide the vote of absent

participation than the larger sections. There is probably an optimum number of participants at section meetings, perhaps 50 or 60 persons. If this observation were confirmed in other parts of Italy, it could offer good grounds for an eventual reorganization of the sections.

individuals among themselves. It is obfuscated by the method by which those persons who have resolved to be silent are made to speak. We consider this practice one of the gravest symptoms of the insufficiency of the parties vis-à-vis the responsibilities that devolve on them.

(1) Such a practice is tantamount to placing an incorrect interpretation upon the meaning of a precise political act (all the more incorrect, the more of a Marxist one is). Absence from a pre-conference meeting without particular justification indicates either indifference or polemical abstention, and in both cases it constitutes a political act that must be taken into consideration and assessed as such.

(2) Such a practice is a manifestation of hypocritical behavior in regard to the bourgeois world, implying as it does that the party possesses and controls a mass basis that, in fact, is nonexistent. Anyone interested in knowing the true state of affairs may easily find out.

(3) The practice amounts to a refusal to face urgent problems by closing one's eyes to them. The attitudes of some of the conference members who have voiced their indignation against those who have exposed some aspects of the problem suggests that it is not merely a matter of purely formal and conventional silence.

(4) The practice denotes a paucity of organizational wisdom, as well as a will to give up a powerful tool for activating the party. If the custom were discarded and the various factions were to be assigned only the votes of their actual supporters, the faction activists would be compelled to intensify persuasion and propaganda efforts directed at all registered voters, so as to induce them to participate in meetings and in the life of their faction and party. It appears, however, that in many sectional and especially pro-

vincial meetings efforts have taken the opposite direction, that of employing dodges intended to keep participation as low as possible, so as to achieve easy unanimity concerning a given motion. In this fashion absentee voters have been made to throw their weight on such motions *en bloc*. It has been noted that several meetings of provincial sections concluded in unanimous consent of particular motions.³

The exposure of this baneful practice, which conceals the reality of participation by the mass basis of political life, and which distorts, at least partially, the internal democracy of the party, may be met by the reply that this has always been the custom with the socialist parties, and that the procedure is generally the same in other parties. For example, the important resolution by which Bissolati and his followers were ruled out of the party in 1905 was passed at a meeting of the Roman section in which only 100 out of 700 registered members participated, and the vote itself was very close. Likewise, the disavowal of the parliamentary faction in May, 1910, was achieved by a vote of 41 to 24, in a section that had about 600 registered members. Citing these and similar episodes, Roberto Michels, in 1911, stated: "In the life of modern democratic parties we may note signs of a wholly analogous collective indifference. The most important decisions taken in the

name of the party that is democratically the most advanced, *i.e.*, the socialist party, often emanate from a handful of members." (*La sociologia del partito politico nella democrazia moderna*. Turin: 1912, p. 51.)

In regard to the present-day situation in other parties, we may mention that recently, in the weekly *Oggi*, the Honorable Pella deplored the growing absenteeism of Christian Democracy, which, though it had a registered membership of 1,300,000 (representing slightly less than a third of its electors), had its section meetings attended by a tenth of its registered members, at best, while important decisions at times were made in the presence of an even smaller proportion. Thus the decisions that commit the party governing the nation are expressions of the superficially and formally consulted will of a few tens of thousands of citizens!⁴

The prevalence of such practices, however, is no justification for defending a procedure that is injurious both to the establishment of an awareness of the true state of political participation and to changing it for the better. It should also be pointed out that more and more frequently the institution of the party must cope with new functional requirements within the political organization, and hence it is increasingly forced to adjust its structural and internal functions to them.⁵ The PSI, on the other hand, is the party that,

³As a specific example of the present system's operation, in a section that has 500 registered members, agreement by 20 of 30 persons present is sufficient to give the section the same number of delegates as another section of 500 members in which, for argument's sake the vote was ten times as great, or 200 out of 300 members present. Moreover, in a section consisting of 50 members, 30 actual votes may worth 10 times less than 30 actual votes in a section of 500 members. In a section in which a faction knows that it has a majority among the persons who usually attend, there is no interest in persuading other registered members to participate. If, instead, each faction were credited only with the votes it actually polled on a given motion, there would be a strong interest at any section meeting and under any conditions to have the maximum number of voters in attendance. A faction would otherwise have a smaller number of delegates at the Conference. In other words, the strength of a faction would lie in its ability to secure the participation of a maximum number of registered members, rather than in its ability to seize possession of the delegates to whom a section is entitled through the smallest possible number of votes.

⁴It should be noted, however, that participation in Christian Democracy is extremely complex because of the presence in its framework of other organizations, such as the ACLI, *l'Azione Cattolica*, *Coltivatori diretti*, and others that are strongly associative in spirit.

⁵Controversies concerning "partiocracy," which have recently developed in many quarters (concerning Italy, cf. the works of Sturzo and Maranini), have been concerned primarily with party apparatus. In reality, they are generally expressions of the political struggles carried on by various "notables"

more than any other, must act in the framework of a new situation and in view of tasks that are novel to Italian society.

These technical reasons may be summarized by saying that a party that proposes to fulfill a new function in civil and political society must evolve a new and adequate structure. A further reason for change is the modified historical context within which modern parties are compelled to operate. One factor that may be mentioned is the threat of fascism, which may be said to be built into the structures of parliamentary democracies and party regimes of the continental European type. Such things as the eye-winkings exchanged by the fortune-tellers of various political factions and of the political parties, the carefully-proportioned multiplication of figures concerning registrations, the instrumental and irrational manipulation of the masses (instead of a permanent, institutional, two-way relationship with them), in the past could have appeared as good-natured astuteness, crafty tricks of old foxes of the Giolitti era. But would we still add up the zeros of absent voters if it were a question of opposing the Italian people to some new fascist or ecclesiastical-police regime?

For the moment we can note only that the 33rd Socialist Conference acted according to the old rules, and that there were no proposals other than the very indirect one by Basso that different procedures be adopted. Should it be concluded from this that, in matters concerning mass participation, the PSI does not look upon truth as

revolutionary?⁶

Or is the entire problem unimportant? We have stated that the faction that controls the party was selected by 10-15% of the registered voters, and that interventions in respect to voting have been few and at times contradictory. The majority not only of the registered members but also of the actual participants in the meetings has given proof that it does not understand the difficult, at times sybilline, language of the motions before the party; the difference between the language of the mass and the official, technico-political, ideological language is enormous. Some may argue, however, that the matter is not really serious, since parties are inevitably ruled by the iron law of oligarchies and are composed of the few who are experts at the game, and since it is inevitable that only a few are capable of expressing their opinions on problems involving political leadership, the orientation of the economic system, the techniques of the state, and so forth. These people argue that the problems outlined above are simply organizational ones, and as such should be treated in an organizational context, separate from questions of the political orientation of the party. Is this a correct way of reasoning?

Such arguments may be the result of two types of fundamental attitudes, both of which were implicitly present at the Conference. First, it may be held that the relationship between the party and the mass, or rather between party and class (the term "class" is never specifically defined), is an irrational and mystic one. The relationship

against their party apparatuses. We believe that the pathology of the apparatus is only a symptom of the underlying evil, *i.e.*, non-participation in political life.

⁶The causes of this condition can be understood only through a systematic investigation of the phenomenon of non-participation based on contacts with the mass itself, that is, an investigation or series of investigations that could mobilize and activate the party in regard to the topics and problems of non-participation. Why do registered members fail to participate? Why do young men fail to enroll in the party (the average age of persons enrolled is rising constantly)? What are the conditions and forms that could bring about mass participation in the life of the political party or of other institutions linked with it? Under what new forms could the will, attitudes, and opinions of absentee members, sympathizers, and actual voters be fully expressed? A discussion, using appropriate techniques, of these and similar topics could renew an interrupted dialogue, and supply the materials for the organizational reconstruction of the party and related collective bodies.

is bel
the re
struc
tional
of rep
any a
of int
is loo
Second
groun
It is
nation
menta
of par
tions
The p
contr
presen
the t
which
Confe

The
credit
a pro
the c
policy
This
a new
lems
is, he
in so
plorat
the e
ist im
a mo
tionsh
the re
group
divid
mean
popul
power
realiz
tion pl
latter
possib

DEC

is believed to be realized automatically, the result of the evolution of the mass-struggle. Any form of organic institutionalization, any technical adjustment of representation, any educational efforts, any application of modernized methods of interpretation of this fundamental will is looked upon as little short of heresy. Second, and here we are on more serious ground, a fundamental problem is posited. It is the problem of the orientation of national economic policy. This orientation may be evolved only at the parliamentary level, in a technically specialized domain in which the immense majority of party members possesses no qualifications that would enable it to participate. The political struggle revolves about the control of investments. Insofar as the present problem is concerned, these are the terms in which we should translate the statements of Riccardo Lombardo, which were the most coherent and concrete among those brought up at the Conference.

The 33rd Conference should be given credit for having made the possibility of a program of development in Italy and the control of investment the essential policy question of the socialist party. This attitude of the Conference suggests a new effort to adjust to the real problems of Italian society. Every socialist is, henceforth, called upon to contribute in some way to the demarcation and exploration of this subject. We propose the following thesis: any policy of economic development in Italy has socialist implications only if it is coupled with a modification of existing power relationships. Such a modification may mean the replacement of individuals or of elite groups (hence of parties) by other individuals, groups or parties; or it may mean a greater degree of intervention and popular participation in the control of power. Only if the latter condition is realized may it be said that the modification of power relationships has taken place in the socialist sense. Only if the latter condition becomes a reality is it possible to carry out a policy of develop-

ment in Italy. This is so for two reasons. First, only a greater degree of intervention, interest and popular participation in economic decisions can overcome particularistic resistance on the part of entrenched private interests. Second, only an active popular interest can authorize the imposition of sacrifices, even temporary sacrifices, upon the people should the development policy dictate such sacrifices as necessary.

The following considerations are relevant to our thesis. Observation of Italian economic development through 1957, a period in which national income has annually increased about 5% and wage income about 2%, suggests that in a period of favorable emergency, as the post-war era has proved to be throughout Western Europe, capitalistic guidance of the economic system can attain rates of development that could scarcely be surpassed by a socialist-oriented economic policy, barring certain forms of compulsory development that would be unthinkable in Italy for both political and economic reasons. It should be noted, moreover, that Western European countries with quite divergent economic policies have had analogous rhythms of development. However, the effects of the recession have been felt, and where Italy is concerned it is believed that with the resumption of normal economic conditions the annual growth in the national economy will stabilize at about 3%. A better investment policy could probably correct certain failings and certain imbalances. The most serious problems in Italy are unemployment and the imbalance between north and south. The primary task of new policy should be to raise the income level of the day-laborers and the unemployed workers of the south to the level enjoyed by the workers of the north, rather than attempting to further increase the well-being of the northern workers.

An honest economic policy would require the imposition of sacrifices and periods of austerity upon many sectors of the population. Only a modification

of power relationships could give socialist significance to this policy. But whom would this modification benefit? As we noted, it would profit the masses and would increase their participation in political life. The masses can participate in political life only if there are in existence institutions and programs in which such participation can operate, and only if such institutions and organizations can function effectively.

Political organisms will be able to justify their claims to the control of power and to leadership in economic policy only if the party or parties are direct channels of transmission, *i.e.*, if they are the tools of participation and representation of a broad population base, or, if you wish, "class." They will not be merely bureaucratically organized delegates of mass interest, in which a group of leaders with more or less expertise replace another set of leaders, but will be the expression of the general will, manifested organically and not only in elections.⁷ Naturally, all this does not exclude the need for the technical elaboration of an economic policy to serve as an alternative, nor does it obviate the need for implementing parliamentary action to prepare cadres of experts trained for such a task.⁸ But the alternative we propose does not involve merely the formation of cadres and the supplying of better-trained groups of leaders; we intend an alternative that is democratic and potentially socialist. Cadres and leaders, by themselves, only constitute another bourgeois party. They are the paraphernalia of a party in which the

selection of competence is restricted to a minimum, in which the principles of solidarity almost vanish, and stratification of social ranks is restored from within; in which even the best intentioned, best trained members aim at nothing else but an ambitious career. In such a party, any task finding its reward in acknowledgement by one's fellow-members rather than in the materialistic and concrete emoluments of career seems to be futile.⁹

It may be objected that the type of social function that we are proposing for a political organization (or for an ensemble of political organizations, of which the party is only one) does not exist, even in countries that from the industrial and social viewpoints are most advanced. To answer such an objection we would mention that, in England, the very conditions of society are different; modes of association are more developed and articulated, and the Labour Party reflects these conditions. Through its complex structure it actualizes, in part, the functions of transmission and representation to which we have referred. As for France, we interpret the Gaullist involution as caused, among other things, by the estrangement of the parties of the Left from the masses. They were incapable of realizing themselves as organs of popular participation and withered into narrow cliques of functionaries and "notables."

It may also be objected that there is a tendency for the masses in modern society to increasingly withdraw from participation in public life. This is true,

⁷On the other hand, an increase of state intervention in the economic system does not necessarily carry matters forward on the road to socialism. In France, for example, the situation is presently similar to that which would obtain in Italy if the Fiat and the Edison firms were nationalized.

⁸We repeat that we have no intention of depreciating the prospects and possible results, including the immediate ones, of a socialistic economic policy. Among other things such a policy could aim at the extremely important task of achieving distributive justice, that is, of securing for everyone the maximum equality of opportunity to achieve the social and productive position for which the person is best fitted, while at the same time increasing the efficiency of economic organization. Moreover, such a policy could secure a better redistribution of income, creating a climate of lesser economic inequality.

⁹It must be pointed out that whereas the average age of the registered members of the PSI is probably high (this was remarked by some federations; for example, see the Milan investigations, the first results of which have been summarized in *Tempi Moderni*, Nos. 3-4), the ages of the intermediate cadres seem rather low. Will this new generation attempt to stabilize the positions it has presently acquired, refusing dangerous organizational tasks? Or will it be bold or generous enough to place itself at the service of a movement of participation?

but it is a refusal, in terms of personal values, to participate in the public activities offered, according to antiquated, outmoded models, by organizations and institutions presently in existence. Essentially, the question is one of developing new modes of participation that take into account the constantly growing and increasingly indispensable technically skilled groups within the complex framework of modern industrial society. This is a task that socialism must attempt, even if no ready-made models are available to be followed and even if the task may seem to run counter to a deeply rooted trend in the contemporary world.

The task is urgent. The advance of fascism is not to be checked by progressive socio-economic and industrial policies, but rather by the intense feeling on the part of a broad segment of the population that they possess parties and political organizations of their own, through which they may regularly participate in public life. (Whether this is done in opposition to or in collaboration with the government of a particular moment is of but secondary importance.)

These various considerations lead us to affirm that mass participation in the life of the Socialist Party, the broadening of this participation and its articulation with organisms external to the party, and the question of modernized organization are fundamental topics that the 33rd Conference of the Socialist Party failed to take up, but which we hope it will work on in the future.

In conclusion, the problem of participation in various forms of political life and, consequently, in economic decisions

and in securing a share in political power, is perhaps the most essential problem of contemporary society, and the one that a socialist ideology is called upon to face and solve. Tendencies observed thus far suggest a progressive abandonment of public participation in traditional forms, and a retreat on the part of citizens to the confines of private life. This trend seems to increase as population increases. The new forms that social institutions such as the family and the factory are assuming, and the novel types of social conditioning made available by the mass media, seem to act in this direction. On the other hand, public participation evinces sudden variations that are difficult to foresee or explain. Revolutionary or quasi-revolutionary situations such as the liberation of Italy in 1945, or electoral phenomena like the *Front Populaire* in France in 1936, have resulted in sudden and extremely widespread forms of participation that have given rise to great acceleration in the transformation of social processes.

Public participation is thus released whenever it becomes necessary, and it needs only the presence of organic forms in order to manifest itself. The factors that may influence participation at the level of the party are of a political nature, in the orientation that the party offers to the country, and of an organizational nature, as are those that we have pointed out above. In its presence on the Italian political stage, the PSI has no choice but to come to grips with these problems.

Alessandro Pizzorno

ON THE COVER: This is a view of the villa of Niccolò Machiavelli (1469-1527), near Percussina, a hamlet of San Casciano, not far from Florence. In 1512 the government of Florence fell, and in November of that year Machiavelli was exiled from the city for a year. In February, 1513, he was implicated in a conspiracy and was racked and imprisoned, only to be released the following month. His political career at an end, he retired to this villa and devoted himself to writing. By the end of 1513 he had written his famous *Principe*, and here he also worked on his *Discorsi*.

Annotated BIBLIOGRAPHY on Policy Research and Political Behavior

(Selection based upon a search of journals published or received in this country since the preceding issue of PROD, books recently published and government documents and fugitive materials recently published. New issues of over 200 journals are currently surveyed.)

ABELSON, H. J. *Persuasion: How Opinions and Attitudes are Changed*. N. Y.: Springer, 1959. Research and experimental data on the "factors and facets of persuasion."

ANDERSON, H., "Knight of the Danneborg. A Socio-statistical Study." *Acta Sociologica*, IV (#2, '59), 7-15. Some social traits in the contemporary bestowal of Danish knightly decorations.

Assn. for Int'l. Soc. Justice, "Our Program." *World Justice*, I (Sept. '59), 5-14. A new journal states its intention to promote and publish speculative and empirical studies designed to implement the principle that material, moral and cultural resources should be made available to all mankind.

BARBERI, B., "Attorno allo scambio di informazioni tra aziende ed enti della Pubblica Amministrazione." *L'industria*, #2, '59, 175-86. A systematic description of the means, needs and problems of communication among government agencies, industries, citizenry.

BARTELS, R., "Sociologists and Marketologists." *J. of Marketing*, XXIV (Oct. '59), 37-40. Interrelationships between studies of marketing phenomena and other social sciences have been inadequately explored.

BARTH, E. A. T., & S. D. JOHNSON, "Community Power and a Typology of Social Issues." *Social Forces*, XXXVIII (Oct. '59), 29-32. Adequate models of community influence are possible only if the impact of "issue content on the selection of influentials" is taken into account.

BATCHELOR, J. H. *Operations Research: an Annotated Bibliography*. St. Louis: St. Louis U. Press, '59. Some 4,200 items, through 1957.

BELOFF, M., "Typologie der politischen parteneien." *Aussenpolitik*, X (Aug. '59), 485-91. Stages in the development of two types of parties, representative and revolutionary.

BERKOWITZ, L., "Anti-Semitism and the Displacement of Aggression." *J. of Abnormal and Social Psych.*, LIX (Sept. '59), 182-87. Experimental evidence for the scapegoat theory of prejudice.

BILKEY, W. J., "The Better Judgment Hypothesis: An Approach to Consumer Welfare Analysis." *R. of Social Econ.*, XVII (March '59), 61-73. Three studies of consumer behavior support the hypothesis that "on the average, adequately informed persons properly guided by the teachings of the [Catholic] Church are capable of forming a judgment regarding the state of their well-being."

BO-ANDERSON & C.-O. MELEN, "Lazarsfeld's Two-Step Hypothesis: Data from Some Swedish Surveys. I." *Acta Sociologica*, IV (#2, '59), 20-33. Social factors important in the formation of public opinion in two areas of central Sweden, focusing on the intensity of face-to-face political communication.

CARLETON, W. G., "American Intellectuals and American Democracy." *Antioch R.*, XIX (Summer '59), 185-204. The dominant American tradition is optimistic, democratic, rational, experimental and pragmatic; it has largely been abandoned by intellectuals of the present.

CASTIGLIONE, B. *The Book of the Courtier*. Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday, 1959 (paper). A new translation, by C. S. Singleton, of the early 16th century work.

CHEVALIER, L., "Recherche scientifique et sciences humaines." *Population*, XIV (July-Sept. '59), 411-16. The role of the human sciences, demography in particular, in the development of scientific research techniques.

CLARK, C., "The Earth Can Feed Its People." *World Justice*, I (Sept. '59), 35-55. Presents selected data in support of the contention that "the earth's resources, if properly developed, would yield material goods sufficient to provide satisfactory livelihood for the whole human race."

CLEVELAND, F. F., "Interlingua - Servitor del Scientia." *Amer. Scientist*, XLVII (Sept. '59), 403-12. Written in and explaining "Interlingua", a vocabulary developed to solve the language problem in international scientific communication. Interlingua words must be present with corresponding forms and meanings in at least 3 of these languages: Italian, Spanish, French, English; Interlingua "can be read, practically at sight, by every educated person."

CLONER, A., & R. W. GABLE, "The California Legislator and the Problem of Compensation." *W. Pol. Q.*, XII (Sept. '59), 712-26. A survey of State legislators and associated persons to identify factors related to the salary a California law-maker should receive.

COHEN, A. R., "Communication Discrepancy and Attitude Change: A Dissonance Theory Approach." *J. of Personality*, XXVII (Sept. '59), 386-96. A laboratory study, suggesting that if a person is made to exert considerable effort to understand propagandistic communications, then the greater the discrepancy between the communication and the person's initial opinion, the more the person's attitude changes.

COOPER, H. C., "Social Class Identification and Political Party Affiliation." *Psych. Reports*, V (June '59), 337-40. On the basis of a national S.R.C. sample persons with similar socio-economic characteristics but different perceptions of their social class status tended to differ in party affiliations.

COWAN, T. A., ed., "A Symposium on Group Interests and the Law." *Rutgers Law R.*, XIII, (Spring, '59), 429-60. The law treats group interests in various fields: W. Blumrosen, "Group Interests in Labor Law;" J. C. Chomie, "Toward a Theory of Group Interests in Federal Income Tax Law-Making;" R. Dickerson, "Group Interests in the Field of Food Law;" J. Greenberg, "Race Relations and Group Interests in the Law;" W. D. Hawkland, "Commercial Group Interests;" R. Kramer, "Interests and Policy Clashes in Conflict of Laws;" W. S. Malone, "Ruminations on Group Interests and the Law of Torts;" D. Sheehan, "Public and Private Groups as Identified in the Field of Trade Regulations;" E. J. Beeker, "Social Reality and Planning Illusions: Some Observations on the Need for a Legal Philosophy of Group Interests."

DAVISON, W. P., "On the Effects of Communication." *Pub. Opin. Q.*, XXIII (Fall '59), 343-60. Criticizes "cause and effect" view of communication, and proposes research on effects of communications in terms of the needs of individuals exposed to them.

DENT, J. K., "Organizational Correlates of the Goals of Business Managements." *Personnel Psych.*, XII (Fall '59), 365-93. A study of executives suggests that "it is the characteristics of the total organization and of all its members that determine its goals," not necessarily the rewards it offers leaders, owners or members.

DEVONS, ELY, "The Role of the Economist in Public Affairs." *Lloyds Bank R.*, LIII (July '59), 26-38. His role is important but limited by complexity, non-economic aspects of many policy questions and widely divergent solutions suggested by economic theory.

ECKSTEIN, H. *Pressure Group Politics: The Case of the British Medical Association*. Stanford: Stanford U. Press, 1959. British medical politics and comparisons with medical and other pressure groups in the U. S. in terms of a new general theory of pressure group politics.

ELDER, R. E. *The Policy Machine*. Syracuse: Syracuse U. Press, 1959. The bureaucratic organization of the U. S. foreign policy-making process.

FAYERWEATHER, J. *The Executive Overseas: Administrative Attitudes and Relationships in a Foreign Culture*. Syracuse: Syracuse U. Press, 1959. Based largely on research on Mexico, regards disparity in national cultures as the root of conflicts between U. S. business executives abroad and foreign executives.

FIELDMAN, H., "The Tragic Comedy of Great Men." *Psych. and Psychoanalytic R.*, XLVI (Fall '59), 3-16. The central thesis is that a new idea or movement "can only be maintained by large numbers of people for any length of time through the intermediary action of the Great Man image."

FERRY, W. H. *The Corporation and the Economy*. Santa Barbara, California: Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, 1959. Notes on the past and present uses of corporate power, with proposals for future control; followed by a transcript of a discussion of the notes by E. Goldman, Reinhold Niebuhr, Robert Hutchins and others.

FISHER, H. H., ed. *American Research on Russia*. Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana U. Press, 1959. Essays on American study and lack of knowledge in 11 fields, including political science, economics, social relations.

FOURASTIE, J., "De la vie traditionnelle à la vie 'tertiaire'." *Population*, XIV (July-Sept. '59), 417-32. Traces changes in the demographic characteristics of the "average man" from the 18th century to the present.

FREE, L. A. *Six Allies and a Neutral*. Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1959. The international outlooks of political leaders in the U. S., Britain, France, West Germany, Italy, Japan and India were evaluated through interviews with 100 parliamentarians in each nation and depth interviews with administrators and other elites.

FREYER, H., "Soziologie und Geschichts-philosophie." *Jahrbuch für Sozialwissenschaft*, 4/10 (#2, '59), 115-25. The interpretation of the philosophy of history in terms of metaphysical hypotheses or in terms of scientific sociology, and the relation of the latter to developments in an industrial society.

GALANTER, E., ed. *Automatic Teaching*. N. Y.: Wiley, 1959. 16 papers on the development of machines to teach successfully and thoroughly; some pilot studies, teaching second and sixth graders by machine, have already been made.

GLANZER, M. & R. GLASER, "Techniques for the Study of Group Structure and Behavior: I. Analysis of Structure." *Psych. Bul.*, LVI (Sept. '59), 317-32. Summary of sociometric and group network techniques for the analysis of group communication structure.

GOSTKOWSKI, Z., "Popular Interest in the Municipal Elections of Lodz, Poland." *Pub. Opin. Q.*, XXIII (Fall '59), 371-81. A pioneering opinion survey in a Polish industrial town that has long been a center of the socialist and Marxist movement.

GRAY, D. J., & A. H. ORRICK. *Designs of Famous Utopias: Materials for Research Papers*. N. Y.: Rinehart, 1959 (paper).

GREENBERG, J. H., "Current Trends in Linguistics." *Science*, CXXX (Oct. 30, '59), 1165-70. Though not a predictive science, linguistics has developed effective descriptive and historical methods.

HAIRE, M., ed. *Modern Organization Theory*. N. Y.: Wiley, 1959. Papers on concept of social organization, human behavior in organization, an interaction approach to organizational theory, etc.

HANSON, R. C., "Predicting a Community Decision: A Test of the Miller-Form Theory." *Amer. Soc. R.*, XXIV (Oct. '59), 662-71. A favorable test of the Miller-Form theory of issue outcome, with a discussion of the theory and operational procedures.

HOWARD, J. B., "International Legal Studies." *U. of Chicago Law R.*, XXVI (Summer '59), 577-96. Difficulties faced by law schools in studying and teaching international and foreign legal matters, and types of teaching and cooperative study programs that have been developed.

HYMAN, H. H. *Political Socialization: A Study in the Psychology of Political Behavior*. Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1959. Summarizes studies of politics from the perspective of psychology.

IVERSEN, R. W. *The Communists and the Schools*. N. Y.: Harcourt, 1959. Nature, extent and impact of Communist activity in the American educational system, 1924 to the present.

JANOWITZ, M. *Sociology and the Military Establishment*. N.Y.: Russell Sage Found., 1959 (paper).

JANSSON, J. M., "The Role of Political Ideologies in Politics." *Intl. Relations*, I (April '59), 529-42. Presents a six-fold typology of ideologies, e.g., calculated lies, expressions of demands of social groups, etc.

JONASSEN, C. T., "Contributions of Sociology to Marketing." *J. of Marketing*, XXIV (Oct. '59), 29-35. These contributions, many of them potential rather than realized, include findings on population, collective behavior, motivation, research designs, prediction, etc.

KANE, J. N. *Facts About the Presidents*. N. Y.: H. W. Wilson, 1959. Extensive individual and comparative biographical, historical and administrative data.

KAUFMAN, H. F., "Toward an Interactional Conception of Community." *Social Forces*, XXXVIII (Oct. '59), 8-17. A theory and proposed research concerning the dynamics and process of community change.

KIRSCH, A. D., "Attitudes of a Restricted Community Toward its Covenant." *J. of Psych.*, XLVIII (Oct. '59), 335-39. A sample survey indicates that more than half the residents in a community restricted by covenant against Jews did not want such a covenant.

KLÖNNE, A., "Die 'Nationale Opposition' in der Bundesrepublik." *Politische Studien*, X (Sept. '59), 584-93. The post-war origins and political orientations, especially in regard to National Socialism, of party groups such as the *Deutsche Reichspartei* and *Deutsche Gemeinschaft*.

LA TORRE, M., "I partiti politici e la vita locale." *Idea*, XV (July '59), 444-50. Commentary on the authority and social and political importance of parties in local life.

LAUSCHMANN, E., "Zur Frage der 'Social Costs'." *Jahrbuch für Sozialwissenschaft*, 4/10 (#2, '59), 193-220. Interprets the concept of "social cost" in economic terms and analyzes its significance for political economy.

LEVY, Y., "Les partis et la démocratie: I. Le problème au XVIII^e siècle." *Le Contrat Sociale*, III (March '59), 79-86. Materials from Rousseau, Montesquieu and others relevant to the theoretical problems posed by the existence of parties in a democracy.

LLOYD, P. C., "The Yoruba Town Today." *Sociological R.*, VII (July '59), 45-63. Effects of political and economic development on social groupings in areas of old Nigerian kingdoms, e.g., the rise of guilds and political associations.

LYNN, D. B., "A Model Man for Applied Psychology." *Amer. Psychologist*, XIV (Oct. '59), 630-32. The ethical problems of the growing capacity for psychological control over human behavior.

MCGILL, B., "Conflict of Interest: English Experience 1782-1914." *W. Pol. Q.*, XII (Sept. '59), 801-27. Summarizes English definitions and solutions to the problem of conflicts between private interests of public servants and the public interest.

MITCHELL, W. C., "The Ambivalent Social Status of the American Politician." *W. Pol. Q.* XII (Sept. '59), 683-98. Surveys the meager data on the status of the elective public official, finding his prestige somewhat higher than believed, suggests propositions on ambivalence in public attitudes and proposes research.

MUNK, A. W., "The Philosopher as Reformer." *Personalist*, XL (Autumn '59), 380-87. "If the *ought* is a vital part of the *is*, then the philosopher cannot be satisfied with the present state of the social order."

NICHOLSON, H., "If the Cold War Eases — Can Our Economy Take It?" *The Magazine of Wall Street and Business Analyst*, CIV (Sept. 12, '59), 692-94, ff. Notes the dependence of much U.S. business on defense spending, and suggests new types of business and government spending and tax reductions of certain types to take up the slack should such spending cease.

NIKSA, V., "The Role of Quantitative Thinking in Modern Economic Theory." *R. of Soc. Econ.*, XVII (Sept. '59), 151-73. A full and somewhat critical survey of the contributions of mathematical and statistical models to economic theory; "There is no existing problem of economics which could be expressed in terms of mathematics but not in ordinary language."

OGDEN, C. K. *Bentham's Theory of Fictions*. Paterson, N. J.: Littlefield, Adams, 1959 (paper, reprint).

OBURN, W. F., "Influences Affecting the Future of Sociology." *Social Forces*, XXXVIII (Oct. '59),

3-7. Cites increasing specialization, use of scientific methodology, the state of theory and special vocabularies.

OLMSTED, M. S. *The Small Group*. N. Y.: Random, 1959 (paper). A survey "of propositions and findings in the study of small (and of primary) groups, focusing on major approaches, assumptions and problems."

OWENS, J. R., "Nothing Steps Them." *Nat'l. Civic R.*, XLVIII (Oct. '59), 458-61. Michigan's law for nominations by a returnable deposit (\$100) has not reduced the number of office seekers.

PARRI, F., "Una politica malthusiana." *Il Ponte*, XV (June '59), 760-69. Malthusian politics and the growth of the modern state.

"Proceedings of the AAPOR Conference." *Pub. Opin. Q.*, XXIII (Fall '59), 407-49. Attention is called especially to H. D. Lasswell on surveys and policy research; a panel on special interviewing techniques; a panel on the researchers' ethical responsibilities; and L. W. Milbrath, D. E. Stokes and W. N. McPhee on new models of political behavior.

PUMPHREY, R. E., "The Introduction of Industrialists into the British Peerage: A Study in Adaptation of a Social Institution." *Amer. Hist. R.*, LXV (Oct. '59), 1-16. Between 1837 and 1911 increasing numbers of industrialists were added to the peerage, which was by the end of the period on its way to becoming a middle class institution."

RATH, R., "A Comparison of Attitude Scores on Some Socio-Cultural and Educational Issues Between Two Samples of College Students After an Interval of Four Years: (India)." *J. of Social Psych.*, L (Aug. '59), 57-64. Shifts in favor of religion, classless society, other Indian nationality groups, etc.

"1,700 Top Executives." *Fortune*, LX (Nov. '59), 138-43. The regional origins, education, salaries, rate of advancement and worries of executives in 17 industries.

SEXTON, R., & V. STAUDT, "Business Communication: A Survey of the Literature." *J. of Social Psych.*, L (Aug. '59), 101-18. Psychology of business communication materials: methods, semantics and content of communication; communication training and research.

STRZELEWICZ, W., "Zum Autoritätsproblem in der Modernen Soziologie." *Kölner Zeit. für Soz. und Soziopsych.*, XI (#2, '59), 198-222. The necessity for deeper theoretical and empirical understanding of the nature of authority, so that changes that are necessary for the survival of institutions ranging from the family to the democratic state can be made.

"The Study and Practice of Planning." *Intl. Soc. Sci. J.*, XI (#3, '59), 327-409. Seven articles on the procedures and methods of planning: J. Friedmann, "Introduction;" R. A. Dahl, "The Politics of Planning;" J. Tinbergen, "Problems of Planning Economic Policy;" E. C. Banfield, "Ends and Means in Planning;" G. Ardant, "Regional Planning and the Problem of Regional Economy;" C. Touretski, "Regional Planning of the National Economy in the U.S.S.R., and its Bearings on Regionalism;" and R. Glass, "The Evaluation of Planning; Some Sociological Considerations."

TIVEY, L., "Reflections on the Growth of Government." *S. Afr. J. of Econ.*, XXVII (March '59), 23-36. Criticizes the philosophies and economic concepts of the "State" and the "public sector," and argues that government growth is part of general societal development and cannot be judged by static criteria.

The Training of Journalists. N. Y.: Columbia U. Press, 1959 (paper). World-wide survey on the training of mass media personnel.

VASCONI, L., "Il dibattito sull'economia e la società polacca." *Passato e Presente*, #9, 1959, 1186-1203. The "new model" of the Polish economy, its democratic elements, and the status of technicians and intellectuals in it.

WAHLKE, J. C., & H. EULAU, eds. *Legislative Behavior*. Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1959. Readings dealing with the theory and research concerning the behavior of legislators and legislatures.

WALLACE, D., "A Tribute to the Second Sigma." *Pub. Opin. Q.*, XXIII (Fall '59), 311-25. A presidential address before AAPOR, sketching the development and criticizing the staidness of opinion research.

WEIDLE', W., "Sur le concept d'idéologie." *Le Contrat Social*, III (March '59), 75-78. The philosophic and political nature of the concept of ideology; "ideology is a system of ideas that does not consider persons."

WEINER, M., "Changing Patterns of Political Leadership in West Bengal." *Pacific Af.*, XXXII (Sept. '59), 277-87. Analysis of 408 West Bengal leaders in various political bodies by age, birthplace, political allegiance, constituency and occupation.

WILLCOX, B. F., & E. J. BLOUSTEIN, "Account of a Field Study in a Rural Area of the Representation of Indigents Accused of Crime." *Columbia Law R.*, LIX (April '59), 551-83. Indigents are rather poorly represented before the courts; procedures to solve this social problem are suggested.

WORLAND, S., "Justice and Welfare Economics." *R. of Social Econ.*, XVII (Sept. '59), 97-111. A critique of the definitions and status of welfare economics from a Catholic Scholastic position.

WSZELAKI, J. *Communist Economic Strategy: The Role of East Central Europe*. Washington, D. C.: Nat'l. Planning Assn., 1959 (paper).

No Prescription Without Diagnosis

(AN EDITORIAL)

The clear distinction often has tactical defects, but logically it remains: in practical affairs, man speaks the language of applied science or that of rhetoric. If he plays the scientist, he follows certain rules of expression, such as "no prescription without diagnosis."

An engineer does not build a bridge without surveying the site; a physician does not prescribe medicine without examining the patient; a social scientist does not advise greater economy without investigating the problem for which economy is to be the remedy.

Does not probably had better read *should not*, for political scientists. They are prone to prescribe first and investigate later. A professor will say "delegate work" without reference to what work and whose work; he will say "more people should vote" without reference to the community at issue; he will urge the "merit system" on every type of government. Several explanations of this behavior may be advanced.

One is that social science is so advanced that it does not need the aid of empirical study of the unique case for which the cure is needed. But save in a few areas, there is no evidence of this perfection.

Another is that social science is strong in general principles, weak on specifics. It knows that most delinquency comes from the environment, but not the source of specific cases of delinquency; therefore it will make sense in general but not in the particular. This is nonsense, since its big failures are as common as its small ones.

A third is that social science language makes it merely seem as if diagnosis has been omitted. Sometimes a man knows the case at hand but speaks of it in the abstract, as when, knowing that a bank in trouble needs more honest officers to get more depositors, he declares that all bankers need to be honest.

A fourth is that social scientists may not or cannot speak in a complicated, quantified language and therefore do not express different probabilities. They say, "City manager government is good for Pawtucket," without knowing anything about Pawtucket, and really mean, "Sixty per cent of all towns could use the manager plan well," or "The manager plan is good for anyone who is rich and only interested in money and I use his preference system."

Still another is that the scientist is deluded concerning one or more of the above. That is, he doesn't know how bad the condition of his applied science is.

Also, social scientists may regard themselves as rhetoricians, guardian angels, as Authorities, as powers, as circus players, etc., and as such are all alike. They consider an applied-science approach a silly thing. They express themselves in the guise of scientists to achieve other goals.

Furthermore, they may be so regarded by their audiences and cannot resist the pressure to be unscientific. "If the ladies' society wants an endorsement from an Authority, why not provide it and make the girls happy?" In any event, he may be sure his advice will not be heeded and he need not be responsible. He will not be paid \$1,000 or \$10,000, either, to study the particular problem before giving advice on it.

Finally, he may dream of a thoroughly correct applied science, but cannot hope to find the data to guide his generalizations. World government, war and peace, capitalism and federal aid to education are big problems that invite wild formulae.

Under these circumstances, every policy scientist (and every applied social scientist) must commit many an offense against science in his lifetime. But to know the reasons therefor suggests how to relieve the habit: reject popularity; specify, and identify with, one's clients; apply the rules and language of science; state the indeterminacy of the counsel; and, by all means, try to examine the patient before prescribing the cure.